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SEX, SCIENCE AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON
IMPUTING LIABILITY TO EMPLOYERS FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
THERESA M. BEINER*
Senator Specter: ... [Ulnderstanding of the fact that you're 25
and that... you're shortly out of law school and the pressures
that exist in this world.... [Elven considering all of that, given
your own expert standing and the fact that here you have the
chief law enforcement officer of the country on this subject
[sexual harassment] and the whole purpose of the civil rights
law is being perverted right in the office of the Chairman with
one of his own female subordinates-what went through your
mind, if anything, on whether you ought to come forward at that
stage, because if you had you'd stop this man from being head of
the EEOC perhaps for another decade. What went on through
your mind? I know you decided not to make a complaint, but did
you give that any consideration, and if so how could you allow
this kind of reprehensible conduct to go on right in the
headquarters without doing something about it?'
Senator Deconcini: ... [Ihf you wouldn't mind repeating to me
what went through your mind, why, number one, you would
stay there after this happened several times, and number two,
even though it ceased for a few months, why you would proceed
on to another job with someone that hadn't just asked you out
and pressed you, but had gotten into the explanations
and-expletives and the anatomy and what have you that you
pointed out to us today.
Ms. Hill: ... At that time, though staying seemed the only
reasonable choice, at that time staying was the way that-in a
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1. Clarence Thomas Confirmation: Hearing ofthe S. Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. (Oct.
11, 1991) (testimony of Prof. Anita Hill), LEXIS Federal News Service, at **31, 69, 73-75
[hereinafter Thomas Hearings].
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way-a choice that I made because I wanted to do the work. I,
in fact, believed that I could have made that choice to do the
work. And that's what I wanted to do. And I did not want to let
that kind of behavior control my choices. So, I attempted to end
the behavior, and for some time the behavior did stop.2
Senator Simpson:... But let me tell you, if what you say this
man said to you occurred, why in God's name, when he left his
position of power or status or authority over you, and you left it
in 1983, why in God's name would you ever speak to a man like
that the rest of your life?
Ms. Hill: That's a very good question. And I'm sure that I
cannot answer that to your satisfaction. That is one of the
things that I have tried to do today. I have suggested that I was
afraid of retaliation. I was afraid of damage to my professional
life. And I believe that you have to understand that this
response-and that's one of the things that I have come to
understand about harassment-this response, this kind of
response, is not atypical. And I can't explain. It takes an expert
in psychology to explain how that can happen. But it can
happen, because it happened to me.
Senator Simpson: Well,... it just seems so incredible to me
that you would not only have visited with him twice after that
period and after he was no longer able to manipulate you or to
destroy you, that you then not only visited with him, but took
him to the airport and then 11 times contacted him. That part
of it appals [sic] me. I would think that these things which you
describe are so repugnant, so ugly, so obscene, that you would
never have talked to him again. And that will [sic]-is the most
contradictory and puzzling thing for me.3
I. INTRODUCTION
As the testimony quoted above shows, Professor Anita Hill
endured a variety of questions about her own behavior regarding
the alleged sexual harassment inflicted by now Justice Clarence
Thomas. Why had she waited so long to come forward? Why didn't
she complain to the powers that be at the time? Why did she
continue to work for him, and even move with him from the
Department of Education to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)? How could she stay in contact with him after
she left the EEOC?' Many of the Senators' assumptions about the
2. Id. at*71.
3. Id. at **73-74.
4. See Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment
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manner in which women should behave came out in their
questioning. They are not, however, the only ones who make such
assumptions. Many assumptions about the way people should
behave also sneak into both lower court and Supreme Court
precedent on sexual harassment.5 Yet, as social scientists' research
shows, Professor Hill's response to the alleged harassment by
Clarence Thomas was consistent with the manner in which many
women actually behave when faced with harassing situations. 6
This Article attempts to bridge the gap between how the courts
assess sexual harassment complaints and how sexual harassment
actually occurs in the workplace. In particular, one developing area
of sexual harassment law will be explored: the defense to employer
liability for supervisor harassment set out in Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton7 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. In
Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court established vicarious
liability for employers for harassment perpetrated by supervisors.
Along with establishing this form of liability, the Court created a
defense for employers. It is in this defense, and lower courts'
interpretations of it, that a disconnect occurs between the way
courts look at harassment and the manner in which harassment
occurs and is responded to on the job. This disconnect becomes
apparent after a review of the latest social science literature on
sexual harassment.
In Part II, I begin by setting out both the Supreme Court
precedent and lower courts' current assessment of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense. In Part III, I review studies from the
fields of Sociology, Psychology, Psychiatry, Organizational Theory
and Women's Studies in an attempt to explain how sexual
harassment operates in the workplace. Finally, I conclude in Part
IV that the assumptions courts make about the way people should
behave in harassment situations are out of synch with the actual
of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1992). As one
commentator stated after the hearings:
The insensitivity and lack of comprehension about the complex psychology of
sexual harassment displayed by the Senators questioning the witnesses in the
Clarence Thomas hearings was, in a word, unbelievable. To not understand
why a woman might fear reporting her powerful supervisor's abysmal behavior
or why a woman beginning her career might take a job which allows
advancement but which reports to a known harasser is to be oblivious to the
total imbalance of power between most men and women in today's workplace.
Anne C. Levy, The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Hearings, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1106, 1107.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
8. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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responses of harassment victims. After exploring the work of social
scientists, I recommend changes to the law of sexual
harassment-changes that are consistent with the purposes of Title
VII, including preventing discrimination and making victims whole.
II. IMPUTING LIABILITY TO THE EMPLOYER
A. Supreme Court Precedent
In 1986, the Supreme Court first recognized a claim for sexual
harassment under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson.9 Since Meritor, lower courts have struggled to determine
under what circumstances they should impute liability to employers
for harassment by supervisors.'0 They have not been so confused
regarding harassment by co-workers, about which the courts have
reached a consensus that if the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take effective remedial
measures, the employer will be liable." There is also a consensus
on quid pro quo cases: when a tangible employment action is taken
against an employee by a supervisor for failing to engage in a
relationship or other sexual acts with a supervisor, the employer is
liable. 12
9. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
10. See Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions, or Privileges
of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643,682-85 (1996); see also David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual
Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 136-40 (1995)
(examining and criticizing the courts' failure to uniformly impose vicarious liability on
employers in cases involving sexual harassment by supervisors and encouraging the adoption
of the California Rule); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273,378 (1995) (advocating conditional notice liability as an alternative
to judicial resolution of individual discrimination claims).
11. E.g., Fenton v. Hisan, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1999); Carter v. Chrysler
Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999) (considering the racial harassment context); Baty v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 1999); Burrell v. Star Nursery,
Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1999). The Court in Ellerth suggested that if a co-worker
is the harasser and the harassee has a reasonable belief that the harasser is actually a
supervisor, the employer could be held liable under an "apparent authority" theory. Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 759.
12. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759-61. The Ellerth Court defined
"tangible employment action" to include "a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. There is
obviously room for interpretation in this definition. For example, is constructive discharge
a "tangible employment action" for purposes of quid pro quo harassment? Compare Durham
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 149 n,5 (3d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that constructive
discharge can be a tangible employment action under Ellerth), and Galloway v. Matagorda
County, Tex., 35 F. Supp. 2d 952,957 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that "Iclonstructive discharge
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When it came to hostile environments created by supervisors,
however, the Meritor Court established no precise rule. 3 Caught
between the trial court's standard of actual notice and the court of
appeals' strict liability standard, the Supreme Court "agree [d] with
the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles
for guidance in this area."" The Court referred to agency rules
because the language of Title VII defined employer to include an
agent of the employer.'" It also acknowledged that common law
agency principles might not be "transferable in all their particulars
to Title VII.""6 With the standard so vague, it is not surprising that
it led to confusion among the lower courts and scholarly debate as
to the standard for imposing liability on employers for harassment
perpetrated by supervisory employees. 7
Since Meritor, the Court has clarified this standard in two
recent cases: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 8 and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.9 In Faragher, the Court addressed the
circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for a
supervisor's acts of harassment that create a hostile work
environment. ° In doing so, the Court acknowledged that its "cases
have established few definite rules for determining when an
employer will be liable for a discriminatory environment that is
otherwise actionably abusive."2' In order to frame a standard, the
Court looked at various theories of imputing liability to employers
qualifies as a tangible or adverse employment action"), with Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192
F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir, 1999) (assuming constructive discharge is a "tangible employment
action" without deciding the issue), and Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283,
294-95 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action
for purposes of quid pro quo harassment), and Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019
(S.D. Ohio 1999) (same), and Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594-95 (D.S.C.
1999) (same).
13. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Justice Marshalljoined byJustices Brennan, Blackmun and
Stevens, would have issued a definitive rule. Id. at 74-75 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Believing the question to be properly before the Court, they urged the adoption of the EEOC
guideline's standard for employer liability, rather than leaving the issue indefinite. Id.
Specifically, they would have held an employer strictly liable for the acts of harassment by
its agents and supervisory employees, while only holding an employer liable for harassment
by co-workers if the employer "knew or should have known" of the alleged harassing
behavior. Id. at 74-78.
14. Id. at 72.
15. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994)).
16. Id.
17. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785 (acknowledging the lower courts' difficulties);
Oppenheimer, supra note 10, at 71; Verkerke, supra note 10, at 277.
18. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
19. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
20. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
21. Id.
278 WILLIAM& MARYJOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:273
for the actions of their supervisors.22  The Court took into
consideration that supervisors can easily misuse their authority
and that the threat of an adverse employment action is always
there for an employee who does not act in the manner a supervisor
wishes.23  However, the Court acknowledged its statement in
Meritor that employers would not automatically be liable for the
acts of their supervisors.24
With this in mind, as well as Title VII's emphasis on correcting
problems before they reach litigation, the Court provided an
affirmative defense to "liability or damages" for employers:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no tangible employment action is
taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense
to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of
the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.'
In both cases, the Court did not specifically state that the
defense is a complete bar to liability.2" Instead, it explicitly stated
that the defense may be used for liability or damages.2" Thus, it
contemplated that lower courts would decide how the defense
should be used in particular cases and conceded that it might be
used, in appropriate circumstances, to limit only damages.2" The
Court also clarified that this defense does not exist if the
supervisor's harassment involves a tangible employment action
against the harassed employee, such as a demotion, pay cut, etc.29
In Faragher, the Court stated that it arrived at this
compromise after considering common law distinctions in agency
22. Id. at 804-05.
23. Id. at 804.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 807 (citation omitted); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
765 (1998) (using identical language).
26. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
27. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
28. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
29. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. These cases involve liability for
quid pro quo harassment. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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law between supervisory acts that benefit the employer and those
it characterized as a personal frolic."0 While acknowledging that
sexual harassment was prevalent enough in the workplace for
employers to reasonably anticipate the occurrence of such conduct,
the Court stopped short of holding the employer liable for all acts
of harassment by supervisors, instead preferring to provide an
affirmative defense.31 The affirmative defense born out of the
Court's compromise in Faragher was incorporated into its decision
in Ellerth."2
In Ellerth, the Supreme Court addressed whether an employee
must prove a tangible job detriment in order to maintain a quid pro
quo harassment claim.' However, the Court recharacterized the
issue as whether the company was vicariously liable for the acts of
its supervisor.3' The Court reasoned that the terms "quid pro quo"
and "hostile environment" are useful in separating harassing
situations in which an employer carries out a threat and one in
which the employer does not. 5 Beyond that, the terms do not have
much significance.3" Thus, although Ellerth's claim involved
unfulfilled threats, that did not defeat her harassment claim. It
simply meant that her claim was a hostile environment claim
instead of a quid pro quo.claim."8 After recharacterizing the case in
this manner, the Court adopted the identical affirmative defense as
adopted in Faragher.3 9
The Ellerth and Faragher Court also described what evidence
might suffice to prove the affirmative defense:
30. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 797-99.
31. Id. at 798, 807. The Court also left open the potential for other agency principles to
be used to impute liability to the employer. Some lower courts have picked up on these
alternatives. See, e.g., Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding the EllerthiFaragher defense unavailable under straight negligence theory for
imputing liability for supervisor harassment); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d
1074, 1081 (D. Kan. 1999) (same).
32. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800.
33. EIIerth, 524 U.S. at 768.
34. Id. at 753.
35. Id. at 751.
36. Id. at 753. This is a bit disingenuous of the Court. Because the Court has created
a defense to employer liability for harassing acts of supervisors in hostile environment cases,
but has created no such defense in quid pro quo cases, the characterization of the case as one
or the other can have a distinct effect on the plaintiff's success in a lawsuit. Characterization
of a case as involving quid pro quo harassment does not allow the employer to use the
affirmative defense.
37. Id. at 754.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 764-65 (using identical language to that of Faragher); see also id. at 766
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the standard adopted in Ellerth was "substantively
identical" to that of Faragher).
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While proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may
appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first
element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed
to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid
harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use
any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden under the second element of the defense.40
The Court's description supports the use of anti-harassment policies
by employers. Although the Court does not mandate that all
employers must have these policies, it suggests that such a policy
often will be the key for an employer to successfully use this
defense. Indeed, lower court interpretations of the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense reflect the usefulness of an anti-harassment
policy in meeting the defense."x The Court suggested that the
combination of an employer-promulgated anti-harassment policy
and the employee's unreasonable failure to use such a procedure
provides proof of both elements of this defense. 2 As the Court in
Faragher explained:
An employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual
harassment, available to the employee without undue risk or
expense. If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of
the employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not
recover damages that could have been avoided if she had done
so. If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be
found against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and
if damages could reasonably have been mitigated no award
against a liable employer should reward a plaintiff for what her
own efforts could have avoided.4"
Thus, while the burden of proof for this affirmative defense is
obviously on the employer, it appears that there may be an implicit
40. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807-08 (1998).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc.,
180 F.3d 806, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1999). I will discuss lower court interpretations of the
EllerthlFaragher defense in this regard later in this Article. See infra Part II.B.
42. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806-07.
43. Id.
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burden on an employee who fails to use the complaint system in
place.4' The Court is effectively placing the employee in the
position of justifying her failure to use the employer's complaint
procedure. As I explain in the next section, depending on how the
lower courts interpret this, these cases may not establish a very
difficult burden for the employer.'
5
The element of imputing liability is just one of several an
employee must establish in order to make out a prima facie claim
of sexual harassment. A review of lower court cases reveals four
basic elements: (1) an employee was subjected to unwelcome
harassment, (2) the harassment was based on his/her gender, (3)
the harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to alter
a term, condition or privilege of employment and (4) in the case of
a co-worker, the employee must show that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment, but in the case of a
supervisor, the employer will be vicariously liable, subject to the
Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense.' The Court also has stated
that harassment should be judged by both the subjective perception
of the victim, as well as that of the objective, reasonable person. 8
The EEOC has also interpreted the EllerthiFaragher defense.' 9
In addition to discussing who should be considered a supervisor for
purposes of the vicarious liability rule,5" the agency gave a detailed
analysis of both prongs of the defense.5 ' It appears from the
beginning of its report that the EEOC's position is that, once
proven, the defense results in no liability to the defendant
employer.52 However, later examples given by the EEOC in
conjunction with Faragher and Ellerth indicate that the defense
could be used to limit damages.53
44. Id.
45. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
46. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
47. Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 702 (8th Cir. 1999).
48. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,81 (1998) (explaining that
Title VII prohibits behavior that is sufficiently "objectively offensive as to alter the
'conditions' of the victim's employment"); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22
(1993).
49. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SuPERvIsORs (1999), 1999 WL 33103140.
50. See id. at **2-4.
51. See id. at **6-15.
52. See id. at *1.
53. See infra notes 56-62; see also Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment
Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SANDIEGO L. REV. 41,
56-57 (1999) (discussing how liability may be limited by applying the EllerthiFaragher
standard).
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The EEOC has liberally interpreted other aspects of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in favor of plaintiffs. For example, the
EEOC points out that the employer must exercise reasonable care
to prevent harassment, as well as ensure that it is corrected
promptly.5 ' Thus, even if the employer corrects a harassing
situation once it occurs, if it did not exercise reasonable care in
preventing the harassment in the first place, it will still be liable.
It is easy to envision a situation in which an employer might be
aware that a particular supervisor harasses employees (perhaps
based on earlier complaints), but has not taken any measures to
effectively stop this serial harasser. Under such a fact pattern,
even if the employer stops the harassment of the latest employee
harassed, the employer arguably has failed to exercise reasonable
care in preventing the harassment given the harasser's proclivity
to engage in such behavior. The employer, therefore, would not be
able to take advantage of the Ellerth /Faragher defense, because it
failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the harassment.
The EEOC also provided examples of situations in which the
employee did not unreasonably fail to avoid harm, but the
harassment persisted. One example the agency gave is where the
employer took reasonable actions to halt harassment after an
employee complaint.55  The employee acted reasonably in
complaining. Therefore; although the employer can satisfy the first
prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, it would not be able to
satisfy the second-that the employee failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities.56 In addition, the
harassment might become sufficiently severe or pervasive before
the employee has an opportunity to complain.57 If the employee
complains in a reasonable manner in order to avoid further harm,
the Ellerth/Faragher defense will not relieve the employer from
liability due to the initial severity of the harassment."
54. See EEOC, supra note 49, at *9.
55. See id. at *7.
56. See id. Interpretation of the EllerthiFaragher defense in this context has caused
confusion for at least one lower court. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795,
796 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with the holding of the
majority, but disagreeing with majority's failure to apply the Ellerth /Faragher standard);
Indestv. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258,265 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J., concurring)
(distinguishing Faragher and Ellerth as the employer inIndest promptly reacted to plaintiffs
harassment claim).
57. See EEOC, supra note 49, at *7.
58. See id. The EEOC's interpretative example in this regard seems to undermine the
agency's initial statement that the employee's delay in reporting provides an absolute
defense. See id. at *7 ("If an employer can prove that it discharged its duty of reasonable
care and that the employee could have avoided all of the harm but unreasonably failed to do
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Finally, the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance. contemplates that
one possible approach is a limitation on damages,59 although it does
not elaborate on this, point. Of course, the EEOC's Enforcement
Guidance is just that-guidance. It remains to be seen whether
lower court decisions will be consistent with the EEOC's rather
broad interpretation.60
One final recent case bears mentioning at this point because of
its potential effect on my solution to the current anomalies in the
manner in which harassment occurs in the workplace and is
addressed by the courts. In 1999, the Court, in Kolstad v. American
Dental Association,61 rendered a decision concerning punitive
damages liability under Title VII. Kolstad involved allegations of
a sexually discriminatory promotion.62 The Court held that the
plaintiff need not show that the employer acted egregiously in
violating her rights in order to be eligible for punitive damages.63
so, the employer will avoid all liability for unlawful harassment."). This interpretation,
however, is consistent with the possibility of single incidents being sufficiently severe or
pervasive to be actionable. Lower court precedent contemplates the possibility of a single
incident case being sufficiently severe to be actionable. See, e.g., Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority
decision, but stating that "a single severe act of sexual harassment can amount to a hostile
work environment actionable under Title VII); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir.
1997) (citing precedent requiring more than episodic or infrequent incidents, and then
refusing to apply it to this case); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1991) (using a single incident of racial harassment as support for liability based on a
single incident of sexual harassment). Without such an interpretation, there would be no
way to hold an employer liable for single incidents of supervisory harassment.
59. EEOC, supra note 49, at *8. The Enforcement Guidance provides that "[in some
cases, an employer will be unable to avoid liability completely, but may be able to establish
the affirmative defense as a means to limit damages. The defense only limits damages where
the employee reasonably could have avoided some but not all of the harm from the
harassment." Id. It also provides an example of a situation in which an employee does not
promptly complain about frequent racial epithets from a supervisor. "lAin unreasonable
delay by the employee could limit damages but not eliminate liability entirely." Id.
60. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has been inconsistent in its deference to EEOC
interpretations. Sometimes it has given them great deference. E.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail, 427 U.S. 273, 278 (1976) (stating that EEOC decisions are "entitled to great
deference"). Other times the Supreme Court has eschewed EEOC interpretations altogether.
E.g., GeneralElec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,140-42 (1976) (stating that because "Congress
... did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations," the level of
deference given its interpretations depends on "the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control"). See generally
Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy:
Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51
(discussing the authority of the EEOC to interpret Title VII).
61. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
62. Id. at 531.
63. See id. at 534-35.
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Instead, the Court held that section 1981a64 requires only that the
"employer must act with 'malice or with reckless indifference to [the
plaintiffs] federally protected rights."'65 In particular, it explained
that the "terms 'malice' or 'reckless indifference' pertain to the
employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal
law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.6
Beyond that holding, the Court also engaged in a rather odd
analysis of how agency principles might affect the award of punitive
damages. 7 The Court wanted to give credit to employers who act
in good faith to comply with Title VII, thereby encouraging
employer compliance.68 In light of this, the Court held:
Recognizing Title VII as an effort to promote prevention as well
as remediation, and observing the very principles underlying
the Restatements' strict limits on vicarious liability for punitive
damages, we agree that, in the punitive damages context, an
employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory
employment decisions of managerial agents where these
decisions are contrary to the employer's "good-faith efforts to
comply with Title VII."69
It remains unclear how this standard would apply in the
context of sexual harassment, where the Court has clearly
established in both Faragher and Ellerth that the employer is
vicariously liable for the harassment by supervisors, absent the
employer's proving the affirmative defense set out in those cases. 70
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
65. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)).
66. Id. at 535. This seems like an odd distinction to make in the context of Title VII
discrimination. Given employers' widespread knowledge that discrimination based on race,
sex, religion, national origin, age and disability is illegal under federal law, it is hard to
imagine a situation in which an employer would be discriminating and not be aware that its
actions might violate federal law. The only arguable exceptions are situations involving bona
fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs), where the employer might argue that it was acting
in good faith based on job requirements and, therefore, believed its actions were within that
exception to the statute. While the Court contemplated this possibility, id. at 535, its
examples only included BFOQs, novel theories and Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) cases. It is not surprising that sexual harassment law, being firmly established at
this point, was not among its examples.
67. Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented from
this portion of the decision on a number of grounds, including that the issue was not before
the Court. Id. at 547. (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
68. Id. at 544.
69. d. at 545.
70. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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B. Lower Court Interpretations of Supreme Court Precedent
While lower courts have only begun to assess the applicability
and contours of the Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense, several
themes have already emerged. First, although the courts are
careful to note that an employer's anti-harassment policy alone does
not meet the requirements of the defense, 71 as a practical matter,
that is the implication of many rulings to date.72 Second, courts
appear skeptical of plaintiffs' reasons for not reporting harassment
at the earliest moment, which helps employers maintain the second
element of the defense-"that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.""
Finally, cases applying the Ellerth/Faragher defense generally
have used it as a complete defense and not simply as a means of
formulating the appropriate remedy.7 Courts also use the defense
to remove the case from the jury, either by granting summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law."
Courts discussing the Ellerth/Faragher defense have
acknowledged that implementation of an anti-sexual harassment
policy may not insulate an employer from liability.76 Implementa-
tion of such a policy, however, seems to satisfy the first prong of the
defense in many cases. 77  As the Fourth Circuit explained in
71. Indeed, both Faragher and Ellerth suggest this. See supra notes 40-41 and
accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Watkins v. Profl Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. CA-97-520-L, 1999 WL 1032614, at
*4 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam); Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283,
295 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 1999). But see, e.g., Hurley
v. Atlanta City Police Dep't., 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the employer
could not hide behind an anti-harassment policy and assert the Ellerth IFaragher defense
where it clearly failed to implement its own policy).
73. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5; Brown, 184 F. 3d at 397-98; Caridad, 191
F. 3d at 296. But see Todd v. Ortho Biotech Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold,
J., concurring in judgment) ("The affirmative defense set out in the two recent Supreme
Court opinions, however, is not always a complete defense to liability. It can also be a
defense to damages only.").
75. E.g., Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1362 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding
summary judgment); Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *1 (upholding judgement as a matter
of law). But see Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889-90.(8th Cir. 1998) (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment in part and remanding to fact finder to consider
affirmative defense).
76. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at **4-5; Hurley, 174 F.3d at 118.
77. E.g., Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811 (7th Cir. 1999) ("T]he existence of
an appropriate anti-harassment policy will often satisfy this first prong."); Watkins, 1999 WL
1032614, at *4.
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Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd.,78 the sexual
harassment policy's "'existence... militates strongly in favor of a
conclusion that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and promptly correct sexual harassment." 79 Even if the employer
is unsuccessful in stopping harassment following a complaint
pursuant to an anti-sexual harassment policy, the employer still
may satisfy the first prong of the defense. As the court in Caridad
explained "[an employer need not prove success in preventing
harassing behavior in order to demonstrate that it exercised
reasonable care in preventing and correcting sexually harassing
conduct. 8 °
Further, the existence of such a policy is useful in meeting the
second element of the defense. As the Watkins court also explained,
"[wihen an employer has in place a viable anti-harassment policy,
a demonstration that an employee unreasonably failed to utilize the
complaint procedure provided by the employer 'will normally suffice
to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense.' 81 If a plaintiff delays in reporting harassment pursuant
to such a policy, many courts appear willing to find that the second
element has been satisfied. For example, the plaintiff's delay in
reporting her rape by a supervisor in Watkins was about four
months.8 2 In Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,8 the
employee also waited a few months to report the harassment.84
These delays provide defendants with proof of the second element
of the defense.
Although the plaintiffs in these cases tried to explain their
reasons for not reporting the harassment earlier, many courts have
been unreceptive to such explanations, deeming them unreasonable.
As the court in Caridad explained:
We do not doubt that there are many reasons why a victimized
employee may be reluctant to report acts of workplace
harassment, but for that reluctance to preclude the employer's
78. 1999 WL 1032614, at *4.
79. Id. (quoting Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also Caridad, 191
F.3d at 295 (stating that the existence of a policy and employer's "endeavors to investigate
and remedy problems reported by its employees" are sufficient).
80. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 295; see also Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925,929,933-34
(7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the defendant still may take advantage of the defense even
though "a stern warning" did not end the harassment).
81. Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
82. Id. at*1.
83. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 290.
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affirmative defense, it must be based on apprehension of what
the employer might do, not merely on concern about the reaction
of co-workers. 5
The court in Caridad fails to recognize the circumstances that led
to the plaintiffs delay. The plaintiff was the only woman out of
twelve electricians in her work unit.8 Initially, Caridad did not
report the harassment she experienced from both her supervisor
and co-workers." After telling her employer about the harassment,
she did not want to pursuethe complaint because "she did not think
an investigation would improve matters."88 She also did not trust
the company's equal employment office.8" Therefore, the employer
did not take further action on her allegations. 0 Although the
employer offered to transfer her to another shift, Caridad refused
the offer, believing it would not help; all other work areas, like her
current one, were predominately male.9'
The plaintiff in Savino v. C.P. Hall Co.92 likewise delayed
reporting for about four months. 9 Similarly, the plaintiff in
Watkins did not report her rape by a supervisor until four months
after it happened. 9' When a less severe subsequent incident
occurred, she did inform another supervisor.95 The Fourth Circuit
held that no reasonable jury could find for Watkins and upheld the
lower court's granting of judgment as a matter of law.9" As the
85. Id. at 295; see also Shaw v. AutoZone, 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that the plaintiffs excuse for not reporting that "she did [not) feel comfortable enough" with
anyone at work to discuss the harassment with them was not reasonable).
86. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 290.
87. Id. Caridad alleged that her supervisor harassed her over a seven month period. Id.
The harassment included sexual touching. Id. Her co-workers treated her in a hostile
manner as well, telling her "that 'nobody cares what happens to you' and that she had
'walked into a lion's den." Id. Eventually, she broke down during a disciplinary hearing
about her absenteeism and told the employer, including the affirmative action director, about
the harassment. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id,
92. 199 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 933. As the court explained, "unreasonable foot-dragging will result in at least
a partial reduction of damages, and may completely foreclose liability." Id. at 935. The court
also held that the employer took prompt remedial action once it learned of the harassment.
Id. at 934.
94. Watkins v. Profl Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. CA-97-520-L, 1999 WL 1032614, at *1 (4th
Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam).
95. This "less severe" incident included a supervisor fondling her breasts and putting his
hands down her pants as she was changing clothes in the uniform room. Id. at *1.
96. Id.
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court in Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc.9 7 explained, "an employee's
subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do
not alleviate the employee's duty under Ellerth to alert the
employer to the allegedly hostile environment."98
The Watkins court extended this further. Faced with a
situation in which the plaintiff testified that she was unaware of
the employer's anti-harassment policy, the court found that she
could be found constructively aware based on the employer's
inclusion of the policy in the employee handbook (which the plaintiff
denied receiving), posting the policy in an area frequented by
employees and placing the employee handbook at work sites.99
"Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could only conclude
that Watkins was at least constructively aware of the policy."'00
Some courts have been a bit more lenient in their
interpretation of the second element. For example, in Watts v.
Kroger Company,1° ' the Fifth Circuit reversed in part the granting
of summary judgment because a jury could find that waiting a
couple months to report the harassment was not unreasonable.'0 2
Further, the court held that the plaintiffs use of a union grievance
mechanism rather than the employer's internal procedure could
satisfy the plaintiffs obligation to take advantage of corrective
opportunities or otherwise avoid harm.'
Failure to aggressively pursue a claini can also result in the
court finding that the plaintiff "failed . . . to avoid harm
otherwise,"04 which will also satisfy the second prong of the
97. 180 F. 3d 806 (7th Cir. 1999).
98. Id. at 813.
99. Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.15.
100. Id. Interestingly, that is not what the actual jury found in this case. Instead, it ruled
in favor of Watkins on her hostile environment claim and awarded her $63,000 in damages.
Id. at *2. The district court refused to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Id.
The district court ultimately granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the
alternative anew trial on the hostile environment claim. Id.; see also Shaw, 180 F.3d at 811
(explaining that plaintiffhad"constructive knowledge" of the anti-harassment policy because
the plaintiff signed an acknowledgment that stated, "I understand it is my responsibility to
read and learn the policies and procedures contained in the AutoZone Handbook and Safety
Booklete).
101. 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999).
102. Id. at 510. The plaintiff stated that the supervisor's harassment intensified in the
spring of 1994; she reported the harassment in July of 1994. Id.
103. Id. at 511. But see DeCesare v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. CNA 98-3851, 1999
WL 330258, at *5 n.12 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1999) (informing union representative of
harassment insufficient to put employer on notice).
104. Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807
(1998)).
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defense. In Brown v. Perry,' the plaintiffs supervisor attacked her
in his hotel room while attending a conference.1 6 Although she told
her bosses about this attack, she decided that she did not want to
pursue the matter formally. 07 Six months later, she was again
attacked in a hotel room by the same supervisor. Referring to the
second attack, the court stated that:
The record in this case is replete with uncontroverted evidence
that Brown [the plaintiff] utterly failed to "avoid harm
otherwise." Less than six months after rebuffing advances from
Boyd in his hotel room late at night, Brown unnecessarily put
herself in a situation that permitted repetition of precisely the
same kind of advances 08
The effect of these cases appears to be that, although the
burden of proof for the Ellerth /Faragher affirmative defense is on
the defendant, a significant burden is placed on the plaintiff to
report harassment, effectively causing the plaintiff to disprove the
second element of the affirmative defense. As one court put it:
'[The law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing" and
an employer cannot be expected to correct harassment unless
the employee makes a concerted effort to inform the employer
that a problem exists. In short, Shaw [the plaintiffl acted in
precisely the manner that a victim of sexual harassment should
not act in order to win recovery under the new law."°
In Brown v. Perry, the court held the employer's response, not doing
anything pursuant to the plaintiff's wishes, adequate even though
the employer's own policy required that all instances of sexual
harassment be reported to a resources manager."0 Although Brown
reported the harassment to her supervisors, they did not pass this
information on to a resources manager, which was required by
105. Id. at 388.
106. Id. at 390.
107. Id. at 391.
108. Id. at 397.
109. Shaw v. AutoZone, 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Parkins v. Civil
Constructors of II1., 163 F.3d 1027, 1038 (1998) (quoting Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126
F.3d 1010, 1014 (1997))).
110. Brown, 184 F.3d at 396. But see Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55,64 (2d
Cir. 1998) (Minding that an employer may be held accountable for knowledge of harassment
where employee, with a duty to report it to employer pursuant to company policy, possessed
knowledge of the harassment).
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company policy."' Instead, the court placed the entire burden on
the plaintiff:
We believe that in these circumstances offering immediate
unconditional support to the victim and suggesting that she
pursue her EEO remedies constitutes an entirely reasonable
effort to prevent further incidents. That this effort proved
unsuccessful is unfortunate, but it does not mean that the effort
was unreasonable. Sometimes, as in this case, an employer's
reasonable attempt to prevent future harm will be frustrated by
events that are unforeseeable and beyond the employer's
control. The law requires an employer to be reasonable, not
clairvoyant or omnipotent."2
Unfortunately, the effect is to require the plaintiff, instead of the
employer, to be clairvoyant and predict subsequent harassment by
a superior.
The Watkins court also suggested that the defendant need not
satisfy the second prong of the defense in order to be successful. As
the court explained:
Even if Watkins' disclosure of the harassment to Dowling were
adequate to establish that she took advantage of available
preventive or corrective opportunities, our result would be the
same. Although the Supreme Court did not speak to this issue
in Burlington Industries, we cannot conceive that an employer
that satisfies the first element of the affirmative defense and
that promptly and adequately responds to a reported incident of
sexual harassment.. . would be held liable for the harassment
on the basis of an inability to satisfy the literal terms of the
second element of the affirmative defense .... Such a result
would be wholly contrary to a laudable purpose behind
limitations on employer liability identified by the Supreme
Court in Burlington Industries: to promote conciliation.113
This interpretation is at odds with the EEOC Enforcement
Guidance, which requires that an employer satisfy both prongs. 114
The result in most of these cases is that lower courts used
Ellerth /Faragher to formulate a complete defense to liability. The
courts did not consider the possibility of the defense being used only
111. Brown, 184 F.3d at 396.
112. Id.
113. Watkins v. Profl Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. CA-97-520-L, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 n.16
(4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam).
114. EEOC, supra note 49, at **6-7.
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to limit damages."' In Savino, the trial court's jury instruction
contemplated that the jury could choose to reduce the damages
based on the affirmative defense,"' and the court of appeals
supported this position." 7 However, the jury ultimately decided
that the affirmative defense was a complete bar to employer
liability in that case." 8 In light of these decisions, the next section
examines how well these interpretations reflect the reality of how
sexual harassment operates in the workplace.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA
The case law on sexual harassment places the responsibility to
prevent harassment on the employer and the responsibility to
report harassment on the harassed employee." 9 The Court also
made clear that this defense does not exist if the supervisor's
harassment involves a tangible employment action against the
harassed employee, such as a demotion, pay cut, etc. 20  The
findings of social scientists regarding both employer control over the
work environment and the reporting behavior of harassed
employees has implications for the duties of both employer and
employee in sexual harassment cases. Social scientists have posited
that sexual harassment is a function of both the person and the
situation.' In this section, I review various studies in an effort to
115. See, e.g., Watkins, 1999 WL 1032614, at *5 (upholding judgment as a matter of law
based on defense); Brown, 184 F.3d at 397-98 (afflirming summary judgment on affirmative
defense); Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 296 (2d Cir. 1999) (granting
summary judgment on affirmative defense).
116. Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 934 (7th Cir. 1999).
117. Id. at 934-35; see also Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999)
(Arnold, J., concurring) ("The affirmative defense set out in the two recent Supreme Court
opinions, however, is not always a complete defense to liability. It can also be a defense to
damages only."); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889 (1998) (suggesting that
proving the defense may only affect damages).
118. Savino, 199 F.3d at 929.
119. See supra notes 71-118. There appear to be two logical exceptions to this. First, if
an employee has no one, realistically, to complain to, he/she may be absolved of the
responsibility ofinformingthe employer of the harassment. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 67, 72-73 (1986) (explaining that where plaintiff had to complain to
harasser, employer not insulated from liability). Second, where the harassment is clearly
obvious to management, the victim may be absolved of the duty to inform the employer. See,
e.g., Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365,1370 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. St. Louis Univ.,
109 F.3d 1261, 1265 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997); Cross v. State Dep't of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir. 1995). It is unclear how the EllerthIFaragher
defense might affect this second exception.
120. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765(1998). Such cases involve liability for quid pro quo harassment.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
121. John B. Pryor, The Social Psychology of Sexual Harassment: Person and Situation
292 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:273
assess whether the courts have implemented a standard that
reflects the manner in which harassment occurs in the workplace.
There are several caveats to the use of social science in
formulating legal standards. Indeed, the use of social science
evidence by courts is not without its detractors.122 While social
science is not always perfect for the task, it still provides useful
information and, in the right case, provides data that might well be
essential to formulating an appropriate legal standard. That does
not mean that one should not be careful in relying on social science.
Instead, the nature of the information must be evaluated based on
legal and factual circumstances to make certain that it provides
reliable and useful information that might help either the judge or
jury.
There are several things to consider before applying social
science in a legal context. First, social science relies heavily on
correlational studies. 2 ' It cannot tell us what causes sexual
harassment, but it can tell us whether there is a correlation
between, for example, a supervisor's attitude toward sexual
harassment and the rate at which sexual harassment occurs in the
workplace. 12' The accumulation of many studies showing such an
effect certainly tells us something about the environment in which
sexual harassment is likely to occur.
Second, many studies rely on data generated by studying
college students." 5 Although this is understandable given the easy
Factors Which Give Rise to Sexual Harassment, in SEX AND POWER ISSUES IN THE
WORKPLACE, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO PROMOTE MEN AND WOMEN WORKING
PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER, 89, 90-91 (1992).
122. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1008-09 (1989); Andrew
Greeley, Debunking the Role of Social Scientists in Courts, HUM. RTS., May 1978, at 34, 34
(suggesting that social science should be relegated to a "minor footnote or two in a brief or
decision"). See generally David M. O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science
and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 8 (1980) (discussing the use of social science in judicial
decision-making); Sheri L. Gronhovd, Note, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The
Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 688 (1987) (same).
123. See generally Faigman, supra note 122 (discussing the reliability of social science
research).
124. Juanita M. Firestone & RichardJ. Harris, Changes in Patterns ofSexual Harassment
in the U.S. Military: A Comparison of the 1988 and 1995 DoD Surveys, 25 ARMED FORCES
& SOC'Y 613,623 (1999) (finding that a 1998 survey revealed a "strong relationship between
environmental and individual harassment").
125. E.g., Patricia A. Frazier et al., Social Science Research on Lay Definitions of Sexual
Harassment, J. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 21, 22-23,25; Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss,
Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual
Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 41, 43 (1993); James M. Wilkerson, The Impact
of Job Level and Prior Training on Sexual Harassment Labeling and Remedy Choice, 29 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1605, 1605-06 (1999).
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access sociology and psychology professors have to such populations,
this might not be the best population to use to study sexual
harassment. Many college students have limited work experience,
and consequently, limited experience with harassment. College
students' ability to eat, house and clothe themselves does not
generally depend on their jobs. Working populations are more likely
to be representative of potential and actual harassment victims,
therefore, I have endeavored to use studies based on those
populations where possible.
Terminology is also a problem. What social scientists refer to
as harassment may not be what courts consider harassment.'26
Indeed, there is little consensus even among social scientists about
precisely what behaviors the term sexual harassment
encompasses. 27 Thus, it is not always clear that the courts'
definition of sexual harassment encompasses the behaviors social
scientists study. For example, courts rely on the severe or
pervasive standard. 2 ' There are very few studies of sexual
harassment by social scientists that incorporate that standard.
However, this need not eliminate the usefulness of social science
research. Social scientists generally study behaviors that are in
and of themselves sufficiently severe or, if repeated enough, would
be considered sufficiently "pervasive" to meet the legal standard.12
9
Therefore, these findings are germane to sexual harassment as the
courts define it. Despite this terminology problem, it is clear that
social science does help us understand a variety of societal
phenomena. Furthermore, courts frequently rely on it for policy
determinations. 30 Indeed, providing the courts with some
information is preferable to their relying on stereotypes or notions
of behavior that have little or no basis in reality.
126. See, e.g., Richard D. Arvey & Marcie A. Cavanaugh, Using Surveys to Assess the
Prevalence of Sexual Harassment: Some Methodological Problems, J. SOC. IssUES, Spring
1995, at 39, 42 (noting the failure of studies to incorporate the severe or pervasive standard);
Sandy Welsh, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 25 ANN. REV. Soc. 169, 171 (1999) (noting
that in early surveys there was "little consensus as to how sexual harassment was defined").
127. See Welsh, supra note 126, at 171.
128. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
129. See, e.g., John B. Pryor et al.,A Social Psychological Analysis of Sexual Harassment:
The Person/Situation Interaction, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 68, 68, 70 (1993) (including in
their analysis a variety of behaviors: "(1) rape or sexual assault, (2) pressure for sexual
favors, (3) sexual touching, (4) suggestive looks or gestures, (5) letters, telephone calls, or
materials, (6) pressure for dates, (7) teasing, jokes, or remarks, (8) whistles or calls, (9)
solicitation for participation in sexual activities and (10) other sexual attention").
130. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-33 & n.10 (1978) (citing nineteen
studies regarding the effects of smaller jury sizes); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 692
(1954) (school desegregation context).
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Finally, much of this research is recent and still developing. 131
This means that there is still much to be done, including such
fundamentals as refining and testing the definitions of sexual
harassment.I12 There is little research discussing the interaction of
sexual harassment with race, ethnicity and socio-economic status, 33
as well as the sexual harassment of men and same-sex harass-
ment. 134 This research is critical given that courts have not been
able to account for harassment that incorporates both race and sex,
and instead disaggregate different forms of harassment as distinct
and separate phenomena."15 Still, several areas of scientific
research provide valuable information about harassment in the
workplace.
A. Situational Factors: The Employer's Influence over the Work
Environment
Social science research suggests that an important factor
indicating whether a woman will be harassed in her workplace is
her work environment.3 6 Increasing evidence suggests that
controlling the workplace environment may be the key to reducing,
and even ending, harassment. 17  As Professors Jackie Krasas
131. See Welsh, supra note 126, at 169-70.
132. Id. at 172-73.
133. Id. at 185; see also Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs, Sociological
Perspectives on Sexual Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 102, 112 (1993)(stating that few studies researched such interactions); Aysan Sev'er,
Sexual Harassment: Where We Were, Where We Are and Prospects for the New Millennium,
36 CANADiAN REV. Soc. & ANTHRoPOLOGY 469, 471 (1999) (noting that "[m]ost of the
literature is focussed on men towards women, but increasingly subsumes issues of racism
and the harassment of gays and lesbians") (footnotes omitted). For an example of a study
that attempts to incorporate race, see Kathleen M. Rospenda et al., Doing Power: The
Confluence of Gender, Race, and Class in Contrapower Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER &
Soc 40, 44-45 (1998).
134. See Welsh, supra note .126, at 185-86.
135. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 WAKEFOREsTL. REV. 71,109-12 (1999) (citing and describing examples of this from
case law).
136. Firestone & Harris, supra note 124, at 623 (finding that a 1998 survey revealed a
.strong relationship between environmental and individual sexual harassment").
137. See Eugene Borgida et al., On the Courtroom Use and Misuse of Gender Stereotyping
Research, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 181, 182-83 (suggesting that information about an
individual reduces the potential stereotypes); Kay Deaux, How Basic Can You Be? The
Evolution of Research on Gender Stereotypes, J. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 11, 15-16
(discussing how stereotypical beliefs may be elicited from the work environment); Susan T.
Fiske & Peter Glick, Ambivalence and Stereotypes Cause Sexual Harassment: A Theory with
Implications for Organizational Change, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 97, 110-11
(discussing how the work environment influences gender stereotypes and incidents of sexual
harassment); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The
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Rogers and Kevin Hanson stated, "gendered work behavior (even
that which results in sexual harassment) should be understood as
constructed within and by gendered workplaces." 8 In particular,
the general atmosphere on the job, the attitudes of supervisors, the
diversity of the workforce, as well as what behavior is tolerated or
not tolerated, all appear to relate to the amount of harassment that
occurs in the workplace.
1. Environments That Objectify
To begin with, an environment free of demeaning images, talk
and behavior is less likely to be harassing. Increasingly, studies
show a correlation between the presence of pornography in the
workplace and the incidence of harassment.139 The effects of pin-
ups and other sexually explicit materials also have been studied.
Researchers found that "interpersonal forms of sexual harassment
such as uninvited sexual attention are more common in offices
where the presence of pinups and other more impersonal sexual
behaviors are part of the general sexual ambience.""0 Although the
Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, J. SOC.
ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 117, 127 (explaining how work environment influences the victim's
response to harassment); Audrey J. Murrell et al., Sexual Harassment and Gender
Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of Women Managers, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at
139, 140-41 (explaining how workplace stereotypes can influence incidents of sexual
harassment); John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Model for Predicting Sexual
Harassment, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 69, 70 (relating how social norms influence
sexual harassment); John B. Pryor et al., supra note 129, at 69-73 (same).
138. Jackie Krasas Rogers & Kevin D. Hanson, "Hey, Why Don't You Wear a Shorter
Skirt?" Structural Vulnerability and the Organization of Sexual Harassment in Temporary
Clerical Employment, 11 GENDER & Soc'Y 215, 226 (1997). Rogers and Hanson offer a
different theory of sexual harassment than one of the main perspectives on the causes of
harassment-the sex-role spillover theory. For more on the sex-role spillover theory, see for
example, Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Sexual Harassment: An Experimental Test of
Sex-Role Spillover Theory, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63 (1997). See also
Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual Harassment
of Women at Work, J. SOC. ISSUES, 1982, No. 4, at 55, 55 (describing sex-roll spillover as "the
carryover into the workplace of gender-based expectations for behavior").
139. E.g., Doug McKenzie-Mohr & Mark P. Zanna, Treating Women as Sexual Objects:
Look to the (Gender Schematic) Male Who Has Viewed Pornography, 16 PERSONALITY& SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 296, 305 (1990) ("For gender schematic males, exposure to nonviolent
pornography seems to influence the way they view and act toward a woman in a task-
oriented (or 'professional') situation."); see also Firestone & Harris, supra note 124, at 623
(detailing a 1995 survey of the U.S. military regarding the effect environmental harassment
has on individual harassment). The study showed that "in those work situations in which
respondents reported no environmental harassment, over 98% also reported no individual
harassment. However, in those contexts with reported environmental harassment, over two-
thirds also reported individual harassment." Id.
140. Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 73.
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Pryor study could not show a direct cause and effect relationship,14'
it did note that there was a high correlation.'42
These studies are supported by others in which men were
"primed" with sexual images. Studies have shown that "primed"
men are more likely to respond to women in a sexual manner.143 As
Professor Deaux explained:
Extending the analysis of situational influences to the work
setting, we can predict that the presence of explicitly sexual
material will prime images of women that emphasize sexual
rather than professional qualities. Photographs from Playboy
or Hustler magazine do little to evoke images of professional
competence or traits of intelligence, knowledgeability, and
career motivation. Rather, the sexual subtype takes precedence
over other possible images of women and thus creates an
atmosphere in which sexual harassment is likely to flourish.""
Pornography affects the workplace because it "targets women
and reduces them to their sexual characteristics.""' In their study
on the influence of sexist priming on subsequent behavior, Rudman
and Borgida showed male subjects television commercials that
portrayed women as sex objects. 1" They then asked the subjects to
interview and evaluate a female candidate for a managerial position
using a preselected set of fourteen questions."' The subjects were
asked to pick seven questions from the set of fourteen-seven of
which were sexist and seven of which were neutral. 148  The
researchers found that the test subjects primed with sexist images
"asked significantly more sexist questions than did controls."149 In
addition, subjects who were told that they had the power to decide
whether to hire the applicant and those who scored high on the
likelihood to sexually harass scale (LSH) 5 ° asked more sexist
141. They noted that it would be impossible to show cause/effect without manipulating the
social norm. See id. at 74.
142. Id.
143. Deaux, supra note 137, at 15 (recounting a study of men who viewed a sexual
videotape as behaving in a more sexual manner than men who watched a political video).
144. Id. at 15-16; see also Borgida et al., supra note 137, at 183 (citing studies showing the
same effect).
145. Fiske & Glick, supra note 137, at 111.
146. Laurie A. Rudman & Eugene Borgida, The Afterglow of Construct Accessibility: The
Behavioral Consequences of Priming Men to View Women as Sexual Objects, 31 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 493, 495 (1995).
147. Id. at 498.99.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 503.
150. See infra notes 200-20 and accompanying text.
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questions. 1 ' At the end of the interview, the researchers asked the
subjects to write down "whatever came quickly and easily to mind"
about the interview.'52 Primed men wrote more words on physical
attributes and the clothing of the interviewee and fewer words
regarding qualifications for the job than did the control subjects.' 53
In their study of sixty subjects, some of whom were shown a
pornographic video and some of whom were shown a control video,
McKenzie-Mohr and Zanna found that "[for gender schematic
males, exposure to nonviolent pornography seems to influence the
way they view and act toward a woman in a task-oriented (or
'professional') situation."54 In this study, after the men viewed
pornography, a female subject interviewed the men about their
transition to college life.'55 Those classified as masculine sex-types
after taking the Bem Sex Role Inventory, which determined
whether the subjects self-identified as masculine or feminine, were
identified as gender schematic males.'56 The behavioral differences
included acting more sexually motivated, moving closer to the
female subject and having faster and greater recall on the female
subject's appearance.5 7 Importantly, the gender schematic males
also remembered less about what the female subject asked them. i5 8
This led McKenzie-Mohr and Zanna to surmise that "[i]ntuitively,
the implications appear grave. If a male manager views a female
employee as a sexual object, information that is relevant to her
work performance, her continuation in the position, or her
promotion may be overlooked."'59 These studies have implications
for employment generally and sexual harassment specifically.
151. Rudman & Borgida, supra note 146, at 503.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 503-04.
154. McKenzie-Mohr & Zanna, supra note 139, at 305.
1'55. Id. at 300-01.
156. Id. at 299. Bem's theory is that "some persons, termed gender schematic, are
believed to have a generalized readiness to process information on the basis of sex-linked
categories and will use this dimension in preference to all other possible bases of
categorization." Kay Deaux & Mary Kite, Gender Stereotypes, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN:
A HANDBOOK OF ISSUES AND THEORIES 107, 119 (Florence L. Denmark & Michelle A. Paludi
eds., 1993). For more on Bern's theory, see Sandra L. Bern, The Measurement of
Psychological Androgyny, 42 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 155, 156-59 (1974).
157. See McKenzie-Mohr & Zanna, supra note 139, at 305.
158. Id. at 304.
159. Id. at 305.
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2. Employers and Local Norms
In addition, harassment is more likely to occur in workplaces
where it appears to be permissible. For example, if harassment is
tolerated, or is not properly punished, employees will receive the
message that it is acceptable behavior. 6 ' The corresponding
message to victims of harassment is that complaining is useless
because nothing will be done about it. Also, if harassment is
perpetrated by supervisors or other company executives, lower level
employees will believe it is permissible for them as well. 6 ' One
particularly interesting study showed that men with a
predisposition to harass will do so when given a "harassing role
model," for example, when they observe a man doing the job they
are assigned to do engage in harassing behavior.'62
This role model behavior fits with the establishment of what
social scientists call "local norms."163 Social scientists and others
have conducted a variety of studies in an attempt to assess how
local norms of behavior factor into perceptions of harassment in the
workplace. Some have explicitly identified what are known as
"sexualized work environments."' In these environments, "sexual
jokes, comments, innuendos, and sexual or seductive dress are
tolerated, condoned, or encouraged."'65 The nature of the
environment may desensitize supervisors to harassing situations. 66
160. Pryor, supra note 121, at 91 (describing a study he conducted in 1991 that revealed
that female employees' ratings of managers' attitudes toward sexual harassment correlated
with the incidence of certain types of sexual harassment on the job); Pryor et al., supra note
137, at 70 ("Potential harassers may perceive that they are free to harass if management
tolerates or condones such behavior.").
161. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 965-66 (8th Cir. 1993).
162. Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 79 (describing an earlier study by Pryor et al., supra
note 129, at 76-77). In that study, college students were asked to train a female participant
to use a word processing program. Id. These students were "trained" by observing a
graduate student who engaged in harassing conduct, for example, flirting, touching the
woman's hair and shoulders and leering at her. Id. Those men with high LSH engaged in
more sexually harassing conduct than low LSH men did. Id. Interestingly, men with high
LSH who observed a more professional role model, for example, one who did not engage in
any sexually harassing conduct, did not engage in such behavior. Id. "Thus, individual
predispositions to sexually harass were acted upon only when the local social norms
permitted." Id.
163. KAY DEAUX ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 90's, at 8 (6th ed. 1993) ("When role
expectations are shared by a group of individuals, they are considered norms, more
generalized expectations about behavior that are learned in the course of interactions with
other members of a society.").
164. Wilkerson, supra note 125, at 1606-07.
165. Barbara A. Gutek et al., Predicting Social-Sexual Behavior at Work: A Contact
Hypothesis, 33 ACAD. MGMT J. 560, 565 (1990).
166. See Wilkerson, supra note 125, at 1607.
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A study by the United States Department of Defense showed
that a higher percentage of harassing incidents occurred in
situations in which the commanding officer was deemed to
encourage harassment.'67 In this study, researchers ran a multiple
regression analysis, revealing that the "more men at a location
[who] saw the CO [commanding officer] as indifferent or neutral
with regard to sexual harassment, the more women at that location
were harassed."68 In addition, in a study of a large organization
conducted in 1991, psychologists found that women who were
sexually harassed in the last two years were more likely to view
managers as negatively responding to allegations of harassment
and less likely to believe that management made a positive
response to their complaints. 169 In this study, the researchers
conducted a multiple regression analysis based on a different
model. 70 They discovered that the more men who agreed that
"[tihe management has discouraged employees from complaining
about sexual harassment... the more women in that office were
sexually harassed." 7
In this second survey, employees also were asked about
incidents of sexually explicit pictures or written materials, sexually
oriented incidents at office parties, sexually explicit graffiti,
sexually explicit software on company computers and gender
segregated work-related parties. 172 The researchers theorized that
such incidents would affect local social norms and lead to a higher
incidence of sexual harassment. 73  They concluded that
"interpersonal forms of sexual harassment such as uninvited sexual
attention are more common in offices where the presence of pinups
and other more impersonal sexual behaviors are part of the general
sexual ambience."174
A lack of gender diversity among workers seems to be a good
predictor of sexually harassing activities. At least one survey has
shown "that women working in male-dominated settings more often
167. See Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 71-72 (describing the study).
168. Id. at 72.
169. Id. at 71.
170. Id. at 73.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. Interestingly, they reached this conclusion by comparing the number of sex-
related behaviors reported by men in the offices with the response of women having
experienced uninvited sexual attention in the same office. Id. They found the two items
significantly correlated. Id. For an example of a sexual harassment case in which sexually
offensive pin-ups and comments were rampant and appeared to have this effect, see Robinson
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-99 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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reported experiencing a highly stereotyped workplace, with higher
levels of unwelcome sexual overtures, than women working in
settings with more equal numbers of women and men."" 5 Other
studies indicate that routine contact with men on the job increases
sexually harassing behavior. 178  Indeed, social science evidence
suggests that once a "critical mass" of non-traditional employees is
present at a workplace, incidents of harassing behavior will
decrease and the character of the workplace will change to
incorporate these new employees as part of the local norm.'" In its
extensive study of federal employees, the United States Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) found that "[vlictims [of sexual
harassment] are more likely than nonvictims to work exclusively or
mostly with individuals of the opposite sex."' Diversity in the
workforce correlates with a reduction in harassment.
3. The Effects of Employer Training and Anti-Harassment
Policies
It seems intuitive that sexual harassment training programs
should have an effect on local norms. However, the effects of sexual
harassment awareness training have yet to be extensively
studied.19  Indeed, "[1]ittle empirical research has assessed the
effects of training on potential harassers' knowledge, behaviors, or
attitudes regarding sexual harassment."'
175. Murrell et al., supra note 137, at 141; cf Gutek & Morasch, supra note 138, at 70
(noting in their study that none of the women in integrated work environments responded
that sexual harassment was a "major problem at work").
176. James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and Organizational
Policies on Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & Soc. 301,302, 311-12
(1998) (citing other studies with similar results).
177. See id. Gruber found that having a predominantly male work environment was a
"significant predictor" of harassment in the form of physical threats or sexual materials. Id.
However, for other forms of harassing behavior, frequency of contact with men, rather than
actual gender composition of the workplace, was a better predictor of the incidence of
workplace harassment. Id. at 312.
178. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SExuAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 17 (1994) [hereinafter MSPB].
179. See Diana L. Bonate & John C. Jessell, The Effects of Educational Intervention on
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 35 SEX ROLES 751, 752 (1996); Robert S. Moyer & Anjan
Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 28
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 333,334 (1998); Elissa L. Perry et al., Individual Differences in the
Effectiveness of Sexual Harassment Awareness Training, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 698,
699 (1998).
180. Perry et al., supra note 179, at 699. For a detailed discussion of the Court's use of
training in the defense, see generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001).
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In a study of the effects of a training video on sexual
harassment, Perry, Kulik and Schmidtke found that viewing a
twenty minute training video did not affect participants' knowledge
of sexual harassment or their propensity to touch a woman during
a subsequent golf lesson.181 Although hampered by a rather small
sample size," 2 they did find that sexual harassment awareness
training "appeared to be more effective" for high LSH men than for
low LSH men.'83 For example, high LSH men who viewed the video
engaged in less inappropriate touching than those who had not
viewed the video. 8 ' Finally, they also found that viewing the video
"was not effective in changing long-term attitudes and belief
systems associated with the propensity to harass."I"' While this
might not be all that surprising, it does suggest that employers
should be hesitant to accept the use of mere training videos if they
truly want to lessen and eradicate sexual harassment at their
workplaces. 8' A later study of the effect of written training
materials showed that written training materials affected what
men considered to be sexual harassment in a positive manner.
8 7
Like the earlier study, a small sample size also hampered this
study. 188
Employers who have policies aimed at addressing harassment
are more likely to receive complaints about harassment than
employers without such policies in place; 89 therefore, they are more
likely to have an opportunity to correct harassing behavior. The
type of policy also appears to have an impact. In his study of nearly
2000 female Canadian workers, James Gruber found that
"providing workers with information about sexual harassment does
have a modest effect on reducing its occurrence, although proactive
methods, such as official complaint procedures or training
181. Perry et al., supra note 179, at 715.
182. Id. at 718. The study only included thirty-six participants. Id. at 705.
183. Id. at 716.
184. Id. at 717.
185. Id. at 716.
186. See id. The authors suggest that more experience-based teaching methods, such as
role playing and group discussion, would be more effective. Id.
187. Moyer & Nath, supra note 179, at 344; see also Wilkerson, supra note 125, at 1611-12,
1617 (discussing a study of managers ofa janitorial business). The janitorial study showed
that prior sexual harassment training did not correlate with managers labeling a "weaker"
factual scenario as sexual harassment. Id. They did, however, identify sexual harassment
more frequently in a strong sexual harassment scenario. Id. In the "weaker factual
scenario, trained employees also endorsed directly confronting the harasser and formal
complaint remedies more than untrained managers. Id.
188. Moyer & Nath, supra note 179, at 341 (stating that the study had eighty-four
participants: one half men, the other half women).
189. Gruber, supra note 176, at 304.
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programs, are much more effective." 9 ' In particular, the lack of
proactive policies is a relatively strong predictor of environmental
forms of harassment, such as "sexual categorical remarks and
sexual materials."19' Proactive employer methods appear to change
or influence local norms. 192 Employers whose workplaces are male-
dominated, or contain sections that are traditionally male, may
have to adjust their training programs because of the differences in
the phenomenon of harassment in these contexts. 193
These studies lead to the conclusion that harassment can be
controlled by an employer's careful attention to the workplace
environment and the creation of appropriate local norms. Although
there is little research assessing what training programs have the
most beneficial effects, preliminary studies indicate that sexual
harassment training does affect at least the types of behavior
people view as harassing. 1
94
Employers can also benefit from instituting an effective
complaint procedure. Such a process could signal to employees that
the employer takes sexual harassment complaints seriously and
might lead to earlier resolutions of such complaints. 195 Sexual
harassment often leads to absenteeism, turnover and lowered
productivity; 96 therefore, the complaint procedures have the
190. Id. at 312. Gruber described "proactive" methods as "indicat[ing] whether the
organization used approaches that modified the work environment by creating official
complaint procedures for sexual harassment problems or conducting training sessions on the
issue." Id. at 309.
191. Id. at 314. Sexual categorical remarks are those remarks made about other women.
Id. at 308.
192. Id. at 316.
193. Wendy Pollack, Expanding the Legal Definition of Sexual Harassment, in SEX AND
POWER ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO PROMOTE MEN AND WOMEN
WORKING PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER 143, 146-47 (1992) (describing the difference between
harassment experienced by women in traditional female jobs and those in traditional male
jobs); see also James E. Gruber, The Sexual Harassment Experiences of Women in
Nontraditional Jobs: Results from Cross-National Research, in SEX AND POWER ISSUES IN
THE WORKPLACE, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO PROMOTE MEN AND WOMEN WORKING
PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER 123, 125-28 (1992) (compiling data that shows that the frequency
of sexual harassment varies with the profession).
194. See Gerald L. Blakely et al., The Effects of Training on Perceptions of Sexual
Harassment Allegations, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 71, 73, 77 (1998). Male students who
had not watched a sexual harassment training video "rated the ambiguous sexually oriented
work behaviors as significantly less harassing." Id. at 77.
195. See Gruber, supra note 176, at 304.
196. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Examining *(and Eliminating) the Consequences of Sexual
Harassment: An Integrated Model, in SEX AND POWER ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, A
CONFERENCE TO PROMOTE MEN AND WOMEN WORKING PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER 61, 65
(1992); Rebecca A. Thacker, A Descriptive Study of Situational and Individual Influences
upon Individuals' Response to Sexual Harassment, 49 HUM. REL. 1105, 1106 (1996); Rebecca
A. Thacker & Stephan F. Gohmann, Emotional and Psychological Consequences of Sexual
SEX, SCIENCE AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE
potential to be a win-win situation for both the employer and the
employee. An effective complaint process could help eliminate both
the harassment and consequent workplace problems. One aspect
of this may be that the employer will have to consider the status of
the harasser, for example, supervisor or co-worker, in designing the
complaint process itself.'97 Avoiding or eliminating sexually explicit
or sexually demeaning materials, hiring a more diverse workforce
and taking allegations of harassment seriously all appear to reduce
harassment in the workplace.
There is, however, one important topic yet to be explored by
social science research. Little research has been done to determine
which procedures are effective for handling sexual harassment
complaints, as well as what types of employer responses to
harassing behaviors are effective in stopping harassment. 198 Thus,
although the courts are eager to find the employer's remedy
sufficient for purposes of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, there is
little evidence in social science literature to support any specific
remedy actually working. Absent a response that actually ends the
harassment, the courts should be circumspect in assessing the
employer's response.
B. Person Factors: The Interaction with High LSH Men
At the beginning of this section, I mentioned that sexual
harassment was a function of both the person and the situation.
The research discussed above focuses on the situation.199 Social
scientists have also attempted to identify the characteristics of men
who are likely to sexually harass. 00 To this end, John Pryor
developed a self-report measure of men who are likely to sexually
harass.20' This measure tests the likelihood that a person will
engage in acts of quid pro quo sexual harassment.2 2 The
Harassment: A Descriptive Study, 130 J. PSYCHOL. 429, 429-30 (1996).
197. Thacker, supra note 196, at 1106-07. It certainly seems logical that a victim of
harassment would have more to fear in reporting harassment by a supervisor than in
reporting harassment by a co-worker.
198. E.g., Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 36 (noting a lack of research in this area).
199. See supra notes 136-98 and accompanying text.
200. Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 78.
201. See John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEXRoLEs 269,272-74
(1987); see also Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 70 (explaining that "it is possible to identify
... characteristics of men who are more likely to sexually harass").
202. See Pryor, supra note 201, at 273-74. Professor Pryor developed his scale to assess
the likelihood of committing quid pro quo harassment because there is the greatest
consensus that this is indeed a form of sexual harassment. Id. at 272-73. The measure
involves self-reported responses to ten hypothetical scenarios in which the subject is asked
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methodology developed to assess quid pro quo sexual harassment
is "conceptually similar" to that developed to study rapists.
20 3
Studies of high LSH men tend to show that these men, like rapists,
link sexuality with power and dominance.2 4
The connection between LSH and other forms of sex-related
indicators has been studied as well and several patterns emerge.0 5
First, correlations between other types of sexual aggression scales
reveal a relationship between LSH and other behaviors.21 6 This
suggests that sexual harassment is another point in the continuum
of "male-aggressive/ female-passive patterns of interaction."
20 7
Second, "[tihe profile [of the LSH man] that emerges from these
findings is that LSH is related to an identification with a
stereotypic view of masculinity. High LSH men tend to view
themselves as hypermasculine." 2°s In addition, "[olne thing
apparently unrelated to the sexual motives characteristic of the
high LSH man is any sense of seeking sex as a means to an
emotional relationship with a woman."20 9 Given this, it is not
surprising that one study has indicated that "high LSH men link
thoughts about sexuality with thoughts about social dominance."210
Research supports this theory.21'
the likelihood that he would engage in certain actions if there would be no work-related
repercussions. Id. at 273.
203. Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 74. For the theoretical connection between power and
sexual harassment, see Gutek & Morasch, supra note 138, at 56-57.
204. See Pryor et al., supra note 129, at 74-75. This supports the theory that sexual
harassment is about power, not sex. See generally Gutek & Morasch, supra note 138, at 56-
57 (describing the power theory of sexual harassment).
205. See John B. Pryor & Lynnette M. Stoller, Sexual Cognition Processes in Men High in
the Likelihood to Sexually Harass, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 163, 166-67
(1994).
206. See Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 75.
207. See id. (citing numerous studies).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 76. There was no correlation between a "Love and Affection" scale developed
by Nelson and LSH, which suggests this conclusion. See id.
210. Id. at 78.
211. See generally John A. Bargh & Paula Raymond, The Naive Misuse of Power:
Nonconscious Sources of Sexual Harassment, J. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 85 (suggesting
that men in positions of power sexually harass as an unconscious reaction to their power);
Denise M. Driscoll et al., Can Perceivers Identify Likelihood to Sexually Harass?, 38 SEX
ROLES 557 (1998) (linking high LSH men with views about traditional roles for women and
men) (citing an unpublished study by A. Barak & N. Kaplan, Relationships Between Men's
Admitted Sexual Harassment Behaviors and Personal Characteristics (1996)); Laurie A.
Rudman & Eugene Borgida, The Afterglow of Construct Accessibility: The Behavioral
Consequences of Priming Men to View Women as Sexual Objects, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 493 (1995).
[Primed men and high LSH men] apparently sat closer to the confederate,
displayed more dominance during the interview, and behaved in a more
sexualized manner than did their respective counterparts. In addition, main
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One controversy regarding LSH is the extent to which high
LSH men are aware that their conduct is harassing. Bargh and
Raymond argue that the majority of sexual harassers do not
understand that their actions constitute harassment.212 As they
explain:
We suggest that for men who are likely to sexually exploit or
rape, the idea of power has become habitually associated with
the idea of sex, such that when they are in a situation in which
they have power over a woman, the concept or motive of sex will
become active automatically-without their intention or
awareness (i.e., non-consciously).213
Research by Pryor, Giedd and Williams suggests a more
conscious form of harassment. Their study of "reason-generation"
"suggests that high LSH men can readily construct a series of
justifications for why they should sexually harass. [High LSH men]
also seem well aware of situational constraints on such behavior.
This seems to reflect a more deliberative process."21'
In her study comparing the reactions of high and low LSH men
to harassing acts of a role model, LaVite found that after observing
harassing acts by a role model, eighty-nine percent of high LSH
men touched the confederate they were training, compared to only
thirty-six percent of low LSH men.215 A study conducted by
Rudman and Borgida suggests than even low LSH men will be more
likely to harass if primed, for example, if they are shown suggestive
pictures of women or if they witness others engaging in harassing
behavior.216 The studies suggest that creating local norms by
providing non-harassing role models may help reduce workplace
harassment, even in high LSH men.217
High LSH also has been linked to men's judgments about the
competency of women. In a study that asked male college students
effects for power obtained on the proximity and sexualized behavior measures,
with high power subjects scoring higher than low power subjects.
Id. at 508.
212. See Bargh & Raymond, supra note 211, at 87.
213. Id.
214. See Pryor et al., supra note 137, at 78 (describing a study by Pryor et al., A Person
X Situation Model of Sexually Harrassing Behavior (1994) (unpublished manuscript)).
215. By 'confederate," this study referred to a female who posed as a trainee to see if men
who follow a role model employing more sexualized training tactics would act likewise. See
Pryor et al., supra note 129, at 77. Pryor also found that when the role model was a non-
harasser, low LSH men touched the trainee more often than high LSH men: fifty-five
percent of low LSH versus twenty-two percent of high LSH. Id.
216. See Rudman & Borgida, supra note 211, at 511.12.
217. Pryor & Stoller, supra note 205, at 168.
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to rate the competency of a female interviewer, researchers found
that "competency of the female interviewer was disparaged the
higher the LSH level" of the interviewee.218 These studies have
implications for any sort of intent analysis that might be applied to
employment law, although it is unclear what role intent plays in
actual cases. 9 Instances of harassment are dismissed because "he
didn't mean anything by it," 220 however, studies of high LSH men
discussed above suggest otherwise.
C. Victim Responses to Incidents of Sexual Harassment
When Anita Hill brought her allegations of sexual harassment
against then Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, the public
and the Senate repeatedly asked three questions: (1) "Why did she
not come forward earlier?," (2) "How could she continue to work for
him?" and (3) "Why did she remain friendly with him?"22' A review
of social science studies on women's responses to sexual harassment
218. Driscoll et al., supra note 211, at 567. The study by Rudman and Borgida did not find
any differences in the rating of females based on LSH, although there was an effect for men
who were primed to view women as sex objects. Rudman & Borgida, supra note 211, at 505-
06. However, Driscoll has an explanation for that outcome based on the format of the study.
Driscoll et al., supra note 211, at 582.
219. The Supreme Court, however, has intimated that intent is not relevant to sexual
harassment analysis. As the Court stated in Ellerth, "{slexual harassment under Title VII
presupposes intentional conduct. While early decisions absolved employers of liability for
the intentional torts of their employees, the law now imposes liability where the employee's
'purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master's business.'"
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (quoting W. KEETON ETAL., LAW
OF TORTS § 70, at 505 (5th ed. 1984)).
220. E.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) ("A recurring point in
these opinions is that 'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms or conditions of
employment.'") (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)); see
also, e.g., Hosey v. McDonald's Corp., Civ. No. AW-95-196, 1996 WL 414057, at *2 (D. Md.
May 17, 1996) (dismissing plaintiffs claim because "Title VII does not prohibit teenagers
from asking each other for dates" in spite of lewd comments and grabbing seat of plaintiff's
pants), affd, 113 F.3d 1232, No. CA-95-196-AW, 1997 WL 240852 (4th Cir. May 12, 1997).
221. Else K Bolotin, Understanding the Emotional Reactions to and Treatment of Sexual
Harassment, in SEX AND POiNER ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO
PROMOTE MEN AND WOMEN WORKING PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER 53, 54 (1992); cf Davis &
Wildman, supra note 4, at 1375-78 (analogizing the skepticism associated with Professor
Hill's testimony with treatment of blacks in the Old South). As commentators pointed out,
Professor Hill's case involved more than sexual harassment; it involved sexual harassment
of an African-American woman, a case requiring individual study. See id. at 1385-86;
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracist Politics, 1989 U. CI.
LEGAL F. 139, 139-40.
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reveals that Professor Hill's reaction was typical of harassed
women. 
222
Although the courts increasingly place the burden on the victim
to report harassment,223 social science studies show that this
requirement may not reflect reality. There is little doubt that
sexual harassment is underreported, despite increased awareness
of the problem.224 Some women do not report sexual harassment
because they do not identify their situations as constituting
harassment.225 Other women, and men, recognize behavior as
harassment, but they fail to report it for a variety of reasons.
2 26
1. Identifying Acts of Harassment
There appears to be a difference between what some women
believe harassment to be in theory and how they apply that concept
to their own situations.227 In other words, a woman may assess a
particular behavior as sexually harassing, yet not perceive that
particular behavior to be sexual harassment when she herself
experiences it. Other women simply do not identify situations as
involving harassment. The process of a victim's acknowledging
sexual harassment is complicated. 2' As one study showed, "large
numbers of women who have experienced relatively blatant
222. See, e.g., Bolotin, supra note 221, at 54-55 (describing, in psychological terms, the
reason for this phenomenon).
223. See supra notes 81-118 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., MSPB, supra note 178, at x; Kimberly T. Schneider et al, Job-Related and
Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two
Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 403 (1997) ("[L]iterature on coping with
harassment suggests that few women make formal complaints about harassment
experiences.").
225. See Arvey & Cavenaugh, supra note 126, at 43 (citing a study indicating that women
may not identify behavior directed at them as harassment); Schneider et al., supra note 224,
at 406-07 (noting that fewer women labeled behaviors as sexual harassment, although they
experienced various forms of harassing behavior); Welsh, supra note 126, at 173-74 (noting
a variety of studies that showed a discrepancy between experiencing sexually harassing
behavior and labeling it as such); see also Gutek & Morasch, supra note 138, at 69-71
(demonstrating that in traditional female-dominated jobs, 'Imlost other people on the job are
treated similarly[, which] . . . sets up a condition under which women workers will be
generally unaware of sexual harassment").
226. Caroline C. Cochran et al.,PredictorsofResponses to Unwanted Sexual Attention, 21
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 207, 217 (1997) (reporting a finding that, in a study of university
students, faculty and staff, the majority of those experiencing harassing behavior chose to
ignore it; only two percent made formal reports).
227. See id. at 217 (noting that in a study of university faculty, students and staff, thirty-
seven percent did not report harassing conduct because they"didn't know if the behavior was
harassment").
228. See Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Acknowledging Sexual Harassment: A Test of
Alternative Models, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 493 (1995).
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instances of such behavior fail to recognize and label their
experiences as [sexual harassment]."2" The Kidder study, involv-
ing how women recall and reconstruct potentially harassing
experiences, found that it was only upon reflection that women
recalled experiences as harassing.2s The women studied recalled
feeling uncomfortable in the situations they were describing and
often felt gullible, naive or ashamed for not foreseeing the harassing
incident.2"' The authors of the study theorized:
Having the words, a name, a category (even if the category is
flawed as any box or set of boxes must be) enables women to
recognize and recall what happens to them with less shame,
guilt, or embarrassment. A social context in which the telling
does not shame or blame the teller makes telling more likely."I
Like other social science research, this again suggests that the
employer's attitude toward harassment will have an effect on
whether women report the harassment. If the employer creates an
environment that encourages complaints and resolves them
effectively, women are more likely to report harassment. Fitzgerald
cites one study showing "that organizational factors were the best
predictors of response when severity of harassment was
controlled."23 In general, the "frequency of reporting [harassment]
can be expected to rise in the wake of increasing sensitivity to this
issue and there is some evidence that it has begun to do so." 23 4
Obviously, sexual harassment policies should encourage victims to
report; however, the policy must be structured so women will
actually use it. Professor Stephanie Riger suggests that many
policies fall short of meeting the needs of female victims because of
such policies' inherent gender biases.' Not all policies will be
effective. Making employees aware of the policy is important, as is
229. Louise F. Fitzgerald etal., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAv. 152, 171 (1988); see also Rogers &
Hanson, supra note 138, at 231-32 (describing how temporary workers downplayed the
significance of harassing incidents and often failed to label them as sexual harassment).
230. See Louise H. Kidder et al., Recalling Harassment Reconstructing Experience, J. Soc.
ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 53, 56.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 62.
233. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 122 (citing study by J.E. Gruber & L. Bjorn,
Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Socio-Cultural, Organizational,
and Personal Resource Models, 67 SOC. SCIENCE Q. 814 (1986)).
234. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 121.
235. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and
Procedures, in SEX AND POWER ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO
PROMOTE MEN AND WOMEN WORKING PRODUCTIVELY TOGETHER 43, 45-48 (1992).
SEX, SCIENCE AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE
ensuring that the company drafts the policy with sensitivity for
harassment victims.
This disconnect between recognizing particular behavior as
sexual harassment and calling that same behavior sexual
harassment when it happens to oneself is supported by several
studies. A study of university students, faculty, administrators and
staff found that only five to ten percent of those surveyed classified
harassing incidents as sexual harassment, even though almost
thirty percent of the sample had experienced harassing incidents."'
A study of nurses conducted by Patricia Hanrahan yielded similar
results.237 Hanrahan interviewed nurses about sexual harassment
on the job.238 Although the nurses identified certain acts as
harassment, they did not agree that these acts constituted
harassment when directed toward them.23 9 As Hanrahan explains:'
This... is further substantiated by the consistent evidence that
the nurses felt that their job mandated the kind of treatment
they were subject to. Theoretically, the behaviors they
encountered "fit" under the sexual harassment rubric. The
characteristics they cited as defining a sexually harassing act
were the same kinds of things they experienced-ongoing,
controlling actions that embarrassed or humiliated them.
Nonetheless, something prevented them from applying the term
to their own experiences.24
Other studies found a similar phenomenon. One involved
temporary workers,"' another examined employees of a large
northwest employer and a midwestern university242 and a third
studied female graduate students. 243  In addition, many of the
nurses in the Hanrahan study mentioned that they felt disrespected
236. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 229, at 171.
237. See generally Patricia M. Hanrahan, "How Do I Know if I'm Being Harassed or if This
Is Part of My Job?" Nurses and Definitions of Sexual Harassment, NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD.
ASS'N J., Summer 1997, at 43 (describing the confusion and lack of consensus as to what
constitutes sexual harassment).
238. Id. at 46.
239. See id. at 54, 56.
240. Id. at 56. However, a study of doctors and nurses demonstrated that they saw sexual
banter as an effective way to relieve job-related stress, See Christine L. Williams et al.,
Sexuality in the Workplace: Organizational Control, Sexual Harassment, and the Pursuit of
Pleasure, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 73, 86 (1999).
241. Rogers & Hanson, supra note 138, at 231-32.
242. Schneider et al., supra note 224, at 406-07.
243. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 229, at 152-53 (Minding that of twenty percent of female
graduate students who had experienced unwelcome sexual behavior, less than eight percent
stated that they had been sexually harassed).
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generally and complainedof ill-treatment by doctors, patients and
hospital administration.' Interestingly, neither Hanrahan nor the
nurses labeled this other behavior as a form of harassment, which
it certainly is, especially after the Supreme Court's decision in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.24
The reaction, or lack thereof, of nurses to incidents of
harassment may well reveal deeper cultural norms that reflect
society's view of male and female sexuality. Peggy Crull has
suggested this:
In our culture sexual aggression is seen as an important ele-
ment of masculinity. Men are thought to have a right and even
responsibility to pursue a woman aggressively. The woman who
directly refuses or complains about the sexual advances appears
to be challenging this right. Sensing that the harasser could
fight back through work harassment, she hesitates to take this
course. On the other hand, the woman who tried to save the
harasser's ego and her job by ignoring or politely handling the
advances may be trapped by a related cultural norm which says
that women are supposed to show their interest in men in an
indirect manner. Harassers often interpret the woman's
attempts to be diplomatic as a discreet "yes" or as an invitation
to try harder.24 6
Research shows that "people tend not to identify some
situations that meet legal criteria as 'sexual harassment'.., and
that individuals, in general, and managers, in particular, feel the
issue of sexual harassment is exaggerated."2 47 Women may not
report harassment because they may not comprehend that the
behavior directed at them might meet the definition of sexual
harassment. This has led some researchers to suggest education
programs for women that not only define what constitutes sexual
244. Hanrahan, supra note 237, at 47.
245. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that:
[Hiarassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discriminationon the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably
find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-
specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace.
Id. at 80; see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1769-74 (1998) (arguing that harassment need not be "sexual" in nature to be actionable).
246. Peggy Crull, The Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job, in MICHELE A.
PALUDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A
RESOURCE MANUAL app. 4, at 133 (1991).
247. Murrell et al., supra note 137, at 146.
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harassment, but also instruct women on how to handle harassing
incidents when they occur.2' 4
Determining why women do not perceive their situations as
involving sexual harassment is difficult and complex.2 49 Stockdale,
Vaux and Cashin attempted to assess the correlation between
various factors and a victim's acknowledging an experience as
harassment.' The Stockdale study, using university students,
faculty and staff as subjects, found that a victim was more likely to
acknowledge an incident as harassment if he/she "had experienced
unwanted sexual attention, such as sexual looks, gestures, or
touching, if (a) the offense[] w[as] frequent and pervasive, (b)
negative affect resulted, (c) the respondent was harassed by a
higher status perpetrator, and (d) the respondent was a woman."251
These researchers found that "[tihe higher the occupational status
of the perpetrator in relation to the respondent the more likely was
the respondent to acknowledge being sexually harassed."252 Studies
also have shown that younger women are less likely to label their
experiences as "sexual harassment."2 Barbara Gutek and Bruce
Morasch argue that women fail to see behavior as harassing
because harassment on the job may be the norm, resulting in sexual
harassment being underreported in female-dominated jobs. 4 In
addition, studies show that employers can create sexualized
working environments by, for example, requiring waitresses to wear
revealing uniforms. 5 Workers in these environments may not
consider their experiences sexually harassing.2"6
Giuffre and Williams posit another explanation for the failure
of victims to label their experiences as sexual harassment. They
248. See, e.g., Azy Barak, Combating Sexual Harassment, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 818, 818
(1992).
249. See generally Stockdale et al., supra note 228 (examining five separate models to
determine why women do not perceive sexually harassing behavior as sexual harassment).
250. Id. at 493-94.
251. Id. at 493.
252. Id. at 492.
253. Cochran et al., supra note 225, at 223.
254. Gutek & Morasch, supra note 138, at 71-72.
255. See Patti A. Giuffre & Christine L. Williams, Boundary Lines: Labeling Sexual
Harassment in Restaurants, 8 GENDER& SOc'y 378, 386 (1994) (describing the impact of"the
employers' prerogative to exploit the workers' sexuality, by dictating appropriate 'sexy'
dress").
256. See Welsh, supra note 126, at 174-75 (recounting a variety of studies suggesting this
phenomenon); see also Ingebjorg S. Folgero & Ingrid H. Fjeldstad, On Duty-Off Guard:
Cultural Norms and Sexual Harassment in Seruice Organizations, 16 ORG. STUD. 299, 311
(1995) ("[I]n a cultural setting where sexual harassment is generally accepted as part of the
job, feelings of harassment may be suppressed to a degree where the victim actively denies
that the problem exists.").
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argue that sexual interaction between co-workers of the same race
and sexual orientation is viewed as less problematic because of
pervasive heterosexual norms.257 Once sexual interaction crosses
race, sexual orientation or power levels, victims are more likely to
label their experiences as sexual harassment.258
2. The Phenomenon of Not Reporting Harassment
Even when women and men believe they are being harassed,
more often than not they do not report it. Data from the 1994
MSPB study of federal employees reveals that of the forty-four
percent of women and nineteen percent of men who reported being
harassed, only twelve percent reported such behavior to a
supervisor or other official.2 59 The most frequent response of the
forty-four percent who were harassed was to ignore it or do
nothing.2' Thirty-five percent reported asking the harasser to stop,
twenty-eight percent avoided the harasser, fifteen percent made a
joke of it, seven percent went along with the behavior and ten
percent threatened to tell or told other people (not supervisors).26'
These responses are consistent with what social scientists have
found regarding responses to harassment as well as the
ramifications of those responses.262
In some cases, adopting these coping strategies may be wiser
than reporting a single incident of harassment. They may allow
women and men to minimize the impact of harassment by seeming
to ignore it 263 or taking steps to avoid harassers.264 Studies show
that job loss and demotion are potential outcomes for sexually
harassed employees. 65 If some form of retaliation is possible, the
257. See Giuffre & Williams, supra note 255, at 397.
258. Id. at 389-96.
259. MSPB, supra note 178, at 30; see also Gutek & Koss, supra note 122, at 37
(recounting a study of automobile assembly line workers that indicated that twenty-three
percent of women ignored harassment and twenty-two percent responded "mildly" to the
harassment).
260. MSPB, supra note 178, at 30.
261. Id.
262. See Sharyn A. Lenhart & Diane K Shrier, Potential Costs and Benefits of Sexual
Harassment Litigation, 26 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 132, 132-33 (1996) (finding that
"substantially less than ten percent of the women who are harassed file a formal complaint
or seek legal help").
263. Sev'er, supra note 133, at 478.
264. Cochran et al., supra note 226, at 222-23.
265. Fitzgerald, supra note 129, at 63; Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 31-32 (indicating
that ten percent of women harassed leave their jobs either by quitting or being fired or
transferred); Thacker, supra note 196, at 1116.
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choice not to report the harassment is rational.266 However,
ignoring harassment or avoiding harassers has implications for the
victim. Avoiding harassers can interfere with and disrupt the
victim's job performance as he/she rearranges his/her job to avoid
the harasser.267
Psychologists Louise Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan and Karla
Fischer noted that the public perception of the manner in which
harassment victims should respond to such incidents and the
manner in which they actually respond are quite different. 8' There
are a variety of reasons why women might not report harassment:
The question most commonly asked concerning victim response
is, "Why didn't she just report him?" Faced with this question,
women give a variety of answers. They believe that nothing can
or will be done, and many are reluctant to cause problems for
the harasser. The most common reason, however, is fear-fear
of retaliation, of not being believed, or hurting one's career, or
of being shamed and humiliated.
6
As a last ditch effort, women complain through official channels
when other responses, such as ignoring the harassment, have
failed.27
0
In her study of nurses, Professor Hanrahan explains that
women often go into "avoidance" when confronted with actionable
harassment.
[lit appears that the nurses did not necessarily take the sexual
advances seriously. Comments such as "I joked it off," "I gave it
back," or "I said, 'Your's (sic] is not so special"' (in response to
patients exposing themselves) were repeated throughout their
anecdotes. These strategies ofjoking and dismissal are evidence
that the nurses were accustomed to inappropriate sexual
behavior, and that they viewed this behavior as something that
must be dealt with in the context of their work.
266. See Sev'er, supra note 133, at 47S. A study of military personnel found that men
likewise do not report harassment. Cathy LZ. DuBois et al., An Empirical Examination of
Same- and Other-Gender Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 39 SEx ROLEs 731, 740 thl.
3 (1998). Of the men surveyed who experienced same-gender harassment, only 7.8% took
formal action. Id. Of the men who experienced other-sex harassment, only three percent
took formal action. Id. By far the most prevalent reason given for not reporting other-
gender harassment was that the victim "saw no need to report it." Id.
267. Cochran et al., supra note 226, at 222-23.
268. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 119.
269. Id. at 122 (citations omitted).
270. James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74
Soc. & Soc. RES. 3, 4 (1989).
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In general, the nurses I surveyed tended to minimize the
significance of sexualized encounters on the job. Staff-originated
sexual acts were typically handled in ways that downplayed them
as sexual actions. Walking away or ignoring something may be an
effective way of escaping from the behavior, but it only indirectly
communicates one's displeasure. Calling something a joke has the
same effect-the action itself is now constructed as only something
to laugh about, minimizing its unwantedness. Likewise, the notion
of overreaction is a corollary of minimization. In leveling the charge
"You are overreacting," perpetrators imply that one's emotional
response is somehow not commensurate with the experience one
has undergone. At the very least, such a charge calls her actual
reaction into question."'
The nurses appeared to be socialized to accept a certain level
of harassment as a normal part of their jobs. 2 Likewise, in his
1989 review of studies assessing women's responses to sexual
harassment, James Gruber noted that avoidance was the most
frequent response, whereas confrontational strategies, such as
confronting the harasser or reporting him, were the least frequent
responses.2 7 ' However, Gruber notes some difficulties with these
studies.274
The 1994 MSPB study suggests a different reason for why
victims fail to report harassment. Fifty percent of the respondents
did not think the harassment was serious enough to report;27 5 this
reaction could be the result of being accustomed to such behavior or
avoiding such behavior. It also could be simply that the incidents
were too insignificant to the employee to warrant a complaint.
Table 1 below shows various reasons victims of harassment in the
1994 MSPB study gave for not reporting it.
271. Hanrahan, supra note 237, at 52.
272. See Wendy Patton & Mary Mannison, Beyond Learning to Endure: Women's
Acknowledgement of Coercive Sexuality, 21 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 31,32 (1998) (noting that
some have theorized that harassment is a function, in part, of socialization based on
traditional masculine and feminine norms).
273. Gruber, supra note 270, at 5.
274. In particular, he is concerned about the lack of data regarding the relationship
between the severity of the harassment, the atmosphere at the victim's workplace and the
victim's response. Id. at 5-6.
275. MSPB, supra note 178, at 35.
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Table 1: Why Victims are Reluctant to Take Formal Action
276
315
As is obvious from the percentages, some respondents gave
more than one reason why they did not report harassment. This
information is particularly interesting because the United States
276. Id. at 35 tbl.11. This table is reproduced directly from the MSPB Report.
Why Victims Feel Reluctant to Report Percentage
Who Agreed
With Statement
Did not think it was serious enough 50
Other actions resolved the situation 40.
satisfactorily
Thought it would make my work situation 29
unpleasant
Did not think anything would be done 20
Thought the situation would not be kept 19
confidential
Did not want to hurt the person who had 17
bothered me
Thought it would adversely affect my career 17
Was too embarrassed 11
Thought I would be blamed 9
Did not think I would be believed 8
Supervisor was not supportive 6
Did not know what actions to take or how to 5
take them
Would take too much time or effort 5
Other 4
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government has made significant efforts to inform its employees
about its sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure.277
Indeed, the 1994 MSPB survey suggests that the vast majority of
federal employees were aware of the government's anti-harassment
policies.2 7
The government survey supports what other researchers have
found regarding the severity of the harassment and the victim's
response. The MSPB study shows that many do not report
harassment because they do not think it serious enough.279
Generally, researchers note that the more severe the harassment,
the more assertive the victim's response.8 ' For example, the Baker
study found, in a study of student subjects, that the severity of the
harassment "had a relatively strong effect on the individuals'
reactions."28 ' However, other studies suggest that a variety of
variables, such as frequency of the offensive behavior, perceived
offensiveness and feminist ideology of the victim, affect whether
women will report harassment.2 2
Jensen and Gutek studied whether victims of harassment
might experience self-blame, which could lead to less reporting of
harassing incidents.283 Of the 135 victims they studied, the
majority did not appear to experience self-blame; however,
approximately twenty-one to twenty-nine percent did.28 4 Those who
acknowledged some self-blame for the harassing incidents were less
likely to report it. 285 Also, women holding traditional beliefs about
277. MSPB, supra note 178, at viii.
278. Id. The survey indicated that eighty-seven percent of federal supervisors and
seventy-seVen percent of non-supervisory employees were trained in the area of sexual
harassment. Id. Seventy-eight percent of employees reported knowing the channels to
follow in order to report harassment. Id. Overall, ninety-two percent were aware that there
was a sexual harassment policy. Id.
279. Id. at 21.
280. See Daniel A. Thomann & Richard L. Weiner, Physical and Psychological Causality
as Determinants of Culpability in Sexual Harassment Cases, 17 SEx ROLES 573, 574 (1987)
("In general, these studies suggest that an incident is more likely to be considered
harassment when it... involves imposing behaviors, i.e., physical contact or threat and
coercion, as opposed to less flagrant socio-sexual actions.").
281. Douglas D. Baker et al., The Influence of Individual Characteristics and Severity of
Harassing Behavior on Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 22 SEX ROLES 305, 318 (1990). They
also opined that "it seems that the more individuals perceived incidents to be harassment,
the more assertive the reactions." Id.
282. See, e.g., Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot, Reporting Sexual Harassment, 15
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 31, 4243, 45 (1991) ("Feminist ideology and frequency of behavior
showed direct effects on perceived offensiveness, which in turn directly predicted reporting.").
283. See Inger W. Jensen & Barbara A. Gutek, Attributions and Assignment of
Responsibility in Sexual Harassment, J. Soc. ISSUES, 1982, No. 4, at 121, 127.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 128.
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the role of women were more likely to assign greater responsibility
to the victim.
2M
The Baker study also found that the gender of the victim made
a difference in what types of harassment victims would report or
ignore. As they explained:
[A] disproportionately high percentage of women said that they
would physically or verbally resist being fondled..., proposi-
tioned with a job enhancement..., or propositioned with no
strings attached. Conversely, a disproportionately high per-
centage of women said that they would ignore wolf-whistles...
or directed gestures . .. ,indicating that the situation and
gender interacted to affect reactions. 7
Being more assertive, however, may not help the harassment
victim. In her analysis of data from the 1988 MSPB study,
Margaret Stockdale, while noting that the effects were small, found
that the "use of confrontive coping strategies tended to exacerbate
negative consequences, especially for men."' This has led
Stockdale to question the current emphasis on reporting harassing
behavior." 9 She suggests that other strategies be developed to help
victims of harassment both cope with and address harassment in
the workplace. 29
3. The Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Victim and Its
Effect on Reporting
It could well be that many victims of harassment do not report
sexual harassment due to fear that they will lose their jobs, not be
believed or simply because it will not help their situations. In a
study of the impact of potential outcomes on whether someone
reports harassment, Ormerod found that fear of negative outcomes
was the most powerful predictor of a victim's response to sexual
harassment.291 In this study, Ormerod found that "[olnly in
286. Id. at 132.
287. Baker et.al., supra note 281, at 318-19.
288. Margaret S. Stockdale, The Direct and Moderating Influences of Sexual-Harassment
Pervasiveness, Coping Strategies, and Gender on Work-Related Outcomes, 22 PSYCHOL.
WOMEN Q. 521, 531 (1998).
289. Id. at 531-32.
290. Id. at 532.
291. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 126 (discussing J. A. Ormerod, The Effect of
Self-Efficacy and Outcome Expectations on Responses to Sexual Harassment (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Illinois, Champaign); Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 34 (citing
study that indicated that among a group of488 women who had been sexually harassed, fifty-
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situations involving explicit sexual coercion did the expectation of
stopping the behavior outweigh the fear of retaliation."292 While
"[c] arefully controlled studies of effects of harassment have not been
done,"293 information is available about some of the effects of sexual
harassment on both victims and organizations. 294 The impact on
victims is difficult to study because it is multi-dimensional,
including impacts on both physical and mental health, as well as
"work variables including attendance, morale, performance, and
impact on career track."295
Beginning with work effects, several studies have examined
work-related outcomes of sexual harassment. The Murrell article
recounted many studies showing the downsides to reporting
harassment:
One of the frequent responses to harassment is to quit one's job.
Women who do complain are often fired or are not able to work
in their field because of bad references. This fear ofjob loss can
cause women to be afraid to report the harassment. For women
who remain on their job, sexual harassment affects women's
satisfaction with the job and the way they think about their
organization. Declines in work productivity and quality are also
common. Thus, women who experience harassment at work
may experience low satisfaction and commitment. Less is
known about the impact of discrimination. Women who
experience both may be particularly prone to experience
negative career outcomes in terms of leaving the organization
(quitting or being fired) or, perhaps, of having fewer promotions
as a result of these negative experiences at work.2
In addition, Gutek and Koss also report many downsides. 97 Coles'
study of eighty-eight formal sexual harassment complaints with the
Fair Employment and Housing Department in California found that
nearly half of those complaining were fired and nearly twenty-five
percent resigned due to the harassment or the complaint process. 28
seven percent "thought their career would be hurt if they complained about the
harassment").
292. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 126 (footnote omitted).
293. Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 31.
294. See MSPB, supra note 178, at 23.27; see, e.g., Terri C. Fain & Douglas L. Anderton,
Sexual Harassment: Organizational Context and Diffuse Status, 56 SEXROLEs 291, 291-92
(1987); Rebecca A. Thacker & Stephan F. Gohmann, Emotional and Psychological
Consequences of Sexual Harassment: A Descriptive Study 30 J. PSYCHOL. 429,429-30 (1996).
295. Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 30.
296. Murrell et al., supra note 137, at 141 (citations omitted).
297. Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 31-32.
298. Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment Complaints and Agency
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'Other researchers have documented a reduction in job satisfaction
from women experiencing harassment.299 In addition, experiencing
or observing sexual harassment by male co-workers or supervisors
correlated positively with the intention of women to quit their jobs
and actually increased that intent by more than twenty-five
percent.3°
There are also negative consequences to litigating a
harassment claim that affect women's lives outside the courtroom.
A recent study of thirty-one women who had experienced
harassment on the job showed that fear of its effect on their loved
ones dissuaded many women from litigating."0 ' As Professor
Morgan explained, "[for most the decision to sue rested upon
assessments of their abilities to do so while also being good
mothers, wives, and daughters."" 2 However, the women seriously
considered litigation if it would make life better for their families. 0 3
Professor Morgan's description of the women's experiences shows
the financial, familial and emotional strain they endured during the
course of deciding whether to sue and during the actual lawsuits.0 4
She concluded, "[a] s their stories show, for the relationally oriented,
parental responsibility, spousal commitment, and insufficient moral
and emotional support are not minor details but major stumbling
blocks in the quest for legal justice."3 5  Because the effects of
harassment extend well beyond the workplace and also invade the
employee's home life, some therapists recommend family therapy
to help the victim and her family cope with the ramifications of
harassment.0 6
Response, 14 SEx ROLES 81, 89 (1986). But see Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 31 (noting
that only ten percent of sexually harassed women quit, transfer or are fired). The difference
in these statistics might well reflect the differing outcomes for those who file complaints
versus those who are harassed but take no action.
299. E.g., David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job
Satisfaction, Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
594, 602 (1998) (concluding, among other things, that "women who feel they have been
harassed have lower job satisfaction").
300. Id. Interestingly, they found that harassment by clients did not positively correlate
with an intention to quit. Id. at 605-06.
301. Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation Choices of
Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & Soc Y REv. 67, 75 (1999).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 75-85.
305. Id. at 88.
306. See, e.g., Robert Henley Woody & Nancy Walker Perry, Sexual Harassment Victims:
Psycholegal and Family Therapy Considerations, 21 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 136,140-43 (1993)
(describing special considerations for family therapy in the context of sexual harassment).
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Court action is 'a victim's least likely response to sexual
harassment,3 0 7 and with good reason. Whether this is due to the
low success rates in court, the lack of lawyers willing to take such
cases or a combination thereof is debatable. 8' Of those who file
lawsuits, only somewhere between one-third to one-half are
successful in those suits.'0 9 One study found that less than one-
third of cases that result in judgments favor the plaintiff. 10 The
Bureau of Justice Statistics recently released a study of claims
brought in 1998 that indicated only five percent of employment-
related civil rights complaints were disposed of by trial;"1 ' however,
plaintiffs won in thirty-five and a half percent of them."1 2
A variety of emotional costs also may discourage women from
pursuing litigation. The psychological effects of sexual harassment
have led researchers to develop the term Sexual Harassment
Trauma Syndrome." 3 The syndrome includes five categories of
psychological problems/reactions to sexual harassment: emotional
and physical reactions; changes in self-perception; social,
interpersonal relatedness; sexual effects; and career effects."1 4
These symptoms are similar to those associated with post-traumatic
stress disorder. 15  In particular, studies show that sexual
307. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 123. Only one percent of those filing charges of
harassment with government agencies resort to lawsuits. Id.
308. Barbara A. Gutek, Responses to Sexual Harassment, in GENDER ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 197,206 (Stuart Oskamp & Mark Costanzo eds., 1993) (noting that
'[almong lawyers who handle sexual harassment cases, many say they turn down more than
90% of people who come to them").
309. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 123; Lenhart & Shrier, supra note 262, at 132-33
(stating that "less than half are decided in favor of the individual alleging harassment").
310. Phoebe Morgan Stambaugh, The Power of Law and the Sexual Harassment
Complaints of Women, NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. ASS'N J., Summer 1997, at 23, 23.
311. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS, 1990-1998, at 6 (2000).
312. Id. at 9 tbl. 9. Since 1990, the range of plaintiffs winning at trial has been from
23.8% in 1990 to a high of 35.5% in 1998. Id. These statistics are for all employment-related
civil rights claims, and do not distinguish between sexual harassment claims and other types
of employment-related discrimination claims. Id. It is not unreasonable to expect this data
to give a rough estimate of how plaintiffs have fared in sexual harassment cases. The report
also reviewed a 1996 study of state employment discrimination cases that indicated plaintiffs
in employment cases were successful in state court forty-eight percent of the time in jury
trials and twenty-six percent of the time in bench trials. See id. at 10.
313. MICHELE A. PALUDi & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 27, 29-30 tbl. 2.1 (1991).
314. See Karen Maitland Schilling & Ann Fuehrer, The Organizational Context of Sexual
Harassment, in PALUDI & BARICKMAN, supra note 313, app. 3, at 129-30.
315. See Gutek & Koss, supra note 125, at 33 (citing many studies describing the various
physical, mental and emotional effects sexual harassment has on victims). There are "four
criteria required to qualify for the PTSD diagnosis: exposure to a stressor outside the realm
of normal human experience, re-experiencing of the trauma, heightened arousal, and
avoidance of people and interests that remind the victim of the trauma." Id. at 33.
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harassment can negatively affect a victim's self-esteem and life
satisfaction.316 The stress of the harassing situation can lead to
both psychological and physical harm.1 ' Although litigation may
serve to compensate and validate the harassment victim, it also can
exacerbate psychological consequences, causing more trauma to the
victim.318 Also, there can be severe career consequences to pursuing
a claim in court, including termination, demotion, loss of
productivity and "blackballing."319 Clinical Professor Sarah Burns
opines that, because credibility plays such a central role in
harassment lawsuits, delays in reporting harassment often
negatively affect female plaintiffs. 2 ° The emotional and financial
costs of this type of litigation, combined with poor success rates
might well explain why sexual harassment victims choose litigation
least.3"2
Sexual harassment also affects the organization. The MSPB
explored outcomes and effects of sexual harassment on the federal
workplace.322 In its 1994 study, the MSPB found that harassment
cost the government an estimated $327 million between April 1992
and April 1994. 23 This figure is based on the impact of sexual
harassment on federal government employees. 24 Specifically, eight
percent reported using sick leave, eight percent reported using
annual leave, one percent took leave without pay, three percent
sought medical or emotional help, seven percent "would have found
316. See id. at 32-33.
317. See id. at 33.
318. Lenhart & Shrier, supra note 262, at 134.
319. Id. at 137-38.
320. Sarah E. Burns, Issues in Workplace Sexual Harassment Law and Related Social
Science Research, J. Soc. ISSUES, Spring 1995, at 193, 195-96.
321. In her study of fifteen women's experiences pursuing sexual harassment claims,
Phoebe Morgan Stambaugh recounts the story of one woman, Zoie, who described how the
litigation affected her life:
I've become completely alienated from my husband since the lawsuit. And my
kids too. When I come home [from a deposition], all I want is to be left alone.
I suppose they wonder where their mother went. To them, it probably feels like
I went to the EEOC one day and never came home again.
Stambaugh, supra note 310, at 29. Professor Stambaugh also recounted harassment victims'
marital troubles due to their lawsuits. Id.
322. MSPB, supra note 178, at 23-27.
323. Id. at 23. The study indicated that, with the money spent on the direct and indirect
costs of sexual harassment by the United States Army in 1994 alone, the Army could have
purchased seventy-eight Black Hawk helicopters or 888 Army Tactile Missile Systems.
Deborah Erdos Knapp & Gary A. Kustis, The Real "Disclosure:' Sexual Harassment and the
Bottom Line, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND
RESPONSE STRATEGIES 199, 209 (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996).
324. MSPB, supra note 178, at 23-24.
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medical or emotion[all help beneficial,"32 two percent were
reassigned or fired, two percent were transferred to a new job and
twenty-one percent reported a decline in productivity. 26 Very
few--only 0. 1%--quit without a new job.327 Unlike Coles' California
study of victims who filed complaints with the state Fair
Employment and Housing Department,328 far fewer federal
employees lost their jobs due to sexual harassment.2 9 These
responses, however, encompassed many employees who took no
formal action to address the harassment.130 Therefore, the
difference between the two studies might well be that the effects of
filing a formal complaint are far more detrimental to the victim's
career than using the various coping strategies federal employees
reported using. 31 Thus, to ignore rather than report harassment
might be a rational response, given the potential for negative job
outcomes.
Fitzgerald and her colleagues suggest a new framework for
assessing harassment that mirrors standards established by the
Supreme Court. 32  They argue for the use of a psychological
explanation, based on the manner in which people respond to
stressful situations, for the response (or lack thereof) of harassment
victims.333 In particular, they argue that "such things as frequency,
duration, and perceived offensiveness, as well as individual factors
(e.g., previous victimization, perceived threat, economic
vulnerability) are involved in any determination of the
psychological severity of a harassing situation. 3 4 The Supreme
Court includes some of these factors in its standard for assessing
whether behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms or conditions of employment, thereby creating an abusive
work environment.
35
325. Id. at 26.
326. Id. Interestingly, these numbers have declined subsequent to the government's 1987
study, in most categories, with the exception of decreased productivity, which has risen from
fourteen percent to twenty-one percent. Id.
327. Id.
328. Coles, supra note 298, passim.
329. Compare MSPB, supra note 178, at 26 (finding that only two people surveyed were
reassigned or fired in 1994 as a result of sexual harassment), with Coles, supra note 298, at
89 (finding that over fifty percent of those surveyed either resigned or were fired).
330. MSPB, supra note 178, at 29.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62.
332. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 123-24.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 124.
335. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The Court noted that all the
"circumstances" must be considered in assessing harassment, including:
[Tihe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
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Fitzgerald and her colleagues also believe that the law has
focused too much on the behavior of the sexual harassment victim,
due at least in part to the use of a "welcomeness" standard.336 As
they explain:
Despite the Vinson court's direction to consider the "totality of
the circumstances," courts repeatedly focus disproportionately
on the victim's behavior, constructing it in a particular way and
ignoring other, equally likely, meanings. As long as the
welcomeness, inquiry remains central to Title VII claims,
women's behavior will continue to be scrutinized and found
wanting, much as women's "resistance" remains the focus of
rape trials even today. 87
Sarah Burns makes a similar criticism, arguing that the focus on
welcomeness in the context of hostile environment cases makes
little sense.3  She asserts that a better understanding of the
circumstances under which relationships in the workplace can truly
be termed consensual is necessary due to power imbalances.339
The research described above, concerning responses to sexual
harassment, suggests several potential modifications to the current
framework used by the courts. Part IV discusses these potential
modifications in more detail.
IV. CHANGES IN THE ELLERTH/FARAGHER LEGAL STANDARD
BASED ON SOCIAL SCIENCE
Social science research on sexual harassment reveals several
gaps between how the courts evaluate sexual harassment cases and
the manner in which harassment occurs in the workplace. This is
especially true with the defense articulated in Faragher and
Ellerth. Although, at first glance, the defense may seem to place a
significant burden on the employer, in actuality, it places an
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The
effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to
determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.
Id.
336. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 133.
337. Id.
338. Bums, supra note 320, at 196.
339. Id. Frances Ranney similarly commented that "[uintil that category [welcomeness
is seriously addressed by the judiciary, any individual bringing a sexual harassment suit will
have the burden of proving not only that she was harassed but also that she did not enjoy it."
Frances J. Ranney, What Is a Reasonable Woman to Do? The Judicial Rhetoric of Sexual
Harassment, NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. ASS'N J., Summer 1997, at 1, 5-6.
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implicit burden on the harassed employee to explain his/her
inaction---or failure to report-in the face of harassment.34 ° In
addition, the EllerthIFaragher defense does not sufficiently consider
the significant role the employer plays in creating, condoning or
refuting an environment that could result in more or less
harassment.341
These anomalies result from the Supreme Court's over-
emphasis on encouraging employer compliance. It is time to take
a close look at the defense and suggest changes to make sexual
harassment laws more effective. Although encouraging compliance
is one of the collateral purposes of Title VII, it is clear that this is
not the only purpose of the statute.142  Lower courts' use of the
Ellerth /Faragher defense hinders several other goals of Title VII.143
Before addressing 'what changes should be made to sexual
harassment law, it is important to consider who should make these
changes. Several potential decision-makers within the legal system
could implement change. The first are jurors, with the help of the
trial judge. For example, it is possible for an expert witness, either
a sociologist, psychologist or psychiatrist to testify about how
women react to harassment in an effort to show that the plaintiffs
failure to use a reporting system was reasonable.3 4'
Allowing jurors to consider social science evidence in this
manner, however, can cause several problems. First is the risk of
changing the role of the jury from fact-finder to policy-maker.3 45 It
is generally the legislature and, in some instances, the courts that
consider the policy implications of creating a new rule of law.346
Second, jurors often have trouble discerning which expert
information is well-grounded. 4" Although the initial gatekeeping
function is in the hands of the trial judge after the Supreme Court's
scientific evidence decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
340. See supra notes 72-115 and accompanying text.
341. See discussion supra Parts III.A.2 and III.B.
342. See McKennonv. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,358 (1995) ("Deterrence
is one objective of these statutes. Compensantion is another.").
343. See infra notes 396-413 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of Title VII).
344. Used in this sense, social science would bear on what have been called "adjudicative
facts," or facts that bear on a factual issue between the parties. Kenneth Culp Davis,
Judicial Notice, 55 CoLuM. L. REV. 945,952,957-58(1955). This is in contrast to "legislative
facts," or facts that are used to develop a general legal rule that would be applicable to all
cases involving the particular issue at hand. Id. Put more simply, it is the difference
between issues of fact and issues of law and/or policy.
345. See Faigman, supra note 122, at 1086-87.
346. See Davis, supra note 344, at 957-58.
347. Faigman, supra note 122, at 1088-89.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 348 and its progeny,149 this does not mean that
juries will be able to easily assess the opinions of two competing
experts. Rather than focusing on the validity of the experts'
conclusions, the juries could be influenced by the persuasiveness of
the particular expert. 50 Although this seems to be a problem with
any proffer of expert testimony, it is especially problematic in the
social sciences, in which issues of causation are difficult to assess
and individual differences in people are not necessarily accounted
for in the studies. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that such
information could be helpful in assessing, for example, the reason-
ableness of a particular plaintiff's action or inaction. Further, if a
judge does a proper Daubert assessment of the evidence, it should
have enough reliability to be considered by the jury.351
Notwithstanding the usefulness of social science to a jury, the
best way to make the changes discussed infra may well be through
either Congress or the appellate courts, both of which have more
policy-making authority than juries. 52 Even though the ability of
courts to consider information on appeal that was not part of the
record at trial is somewhat controversial, 53 courts routinely do
348. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
349. E.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1997).
350. See Faigman, supra note 122, at 1086-87, 1089. Much of Professor Faigman's
criticism, however, is a result of the era in which he was writing, during which the test
established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), was the main method for
evaluating expert testimony. Under Frye, if "the proffered evidence-including the
conclusions reached-was generally accepted in a relevant community of experts," that
testimony would be admissible at trial. Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How
Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 59 (1998). Under
Daubert, on the other hand, the Court required "the trial judge to conduct an independent
inquiry into the scientific validity, scientific reliability, and relevance of the proposed
testimony." See id. at 62. For more on the differences between these two tests, as well as
lower court interpretations of them, see id.
351. Faigman, supra note 122, at 1089 (stating that if judges make a good threshold
determination regarding validity, social science poses fewer problems for the jury). A final
problem with this proposal is that those who cannot afford experts "lose their right of
representation." Id. at 1087. Another advantage to introducing such evidence at the trial
court level is that it allows the opposing side to respond to it. The Supreme Court has been
known to consider facts from studies for the first time on appeal. See Kenneth Culp Davis,
Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931,934 (1980). Worse yet, the Supreme Court will
assume facts that are capable of empirical validation. See id. at 934-35.
352. Faigman, supra note 122, at 1088 ("However sensible an expert's conclusion might
appear as a matter of policy, the proper forum for changing legal rules remains in the
legislature or before judges, not on a case-by-case basis before juries."); Davis, supra note
344, at 953. But see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1975)
(criticizing judges as policy-makers).
353. See O'Brien, supra note 122, at 15 (describing the use of social science statistics by
courts); see also Davis, supra note 351, at 932-33 (discussing whether, and in what
circumstances, factual materials should be supported and available for pre-disposition
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SO.3 51 Commentators have criticized courts' use of social science
evidence, both generally and in specific contexts, on a variety of
grounds. 55 However, it seems more reliable for the courts to
consider this data than to do what they appear to do currently in
the area of sexual harassment: make assumptions about the
manner in which people behave in this context. As one
commentator put it, "Itihe formulation of law and policy, both in the
judicial process and in the administrative process, obviously gains
strength to the extent that information replaces guesswork or
ignorance or intuition or general impressions."356 Some
information, which in many cases will not be perfect, is better than
guesswork. Many of the changes I am suggesting would benefit
from court-wide application, thus a definitive interpretation by the
Supreme Court or a statutory amendment by Congress would be the
best way to implement these suggestions. However, it is not
unreasonable for a trial court to consider them as well in the
appropriate case.
A. Re-evaluating the First Prong: "Whether the Employer
Exercised Reasonable Care to Prevent and Correct Promptly Any
Sexually Harassing Behavior"'
The first prong of the EllerthiFaragher defense has two
components: (1) the employer must exercise reasonable care to
prevent harassment from occurring and (2) the employer must
exercise reasonable care to correct harassment after becoming
aware of it. 58 If the employer's factual showing fails under either
component, the employer should not take advantage of this defense.
I will use two facets of social science to re-evaluate the first prong
of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. One is the effect that the
employer has by setting a local norm that will discourage, and
challenge); Davis, supra note 344, at 952 (noting the need for courts to rely on legislative
facts, whether in the record or not, in the creation of law or policy); Dworkin, supra note 352,
at 1060 (arguing that judicial decisions should be based on principle, not policy).
354. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1108 app. (1997) (describing increased use of non-legal materials in
Supreme Court cases); see also cases cited supra note 130 (citing cases in which the Supreme
Court has relied on social science evidence).
355. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 122, at 1008-09; Greeley, supra note 122, at 34.
356. Davis, supra note 344, at 953; see also O'Brien, supra note 122, at 10-13 (discussing
an article by Peter W. Sperlich, in which he argues that the judiciary should use social
science evidence in a competent manner).
357. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 807 (1998).
358. Id. at 756.
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thereby prevent, harassment. The second is the use of training
programs as a means to either preventing or correcting harassment.
The Ellerth/Faragher defense obligates employers to prevent
harassment. Although the Court in Ellerth suggested that a sexual
harassment policy would provide a sufficient showing on this
prong,359 social science reveals that more is required.360 First, given
the employer's potential positive or negative effect on the work
environment, 36 ' evidence related to the employer's general efforts,
or lack thereof, to raise awareness about and to curb harassing
behavior should be admissible. The employer should be required to
make a factual showing of what it has done to prevent harassment.
Whether the employer has exercised reasonable care in this regard
should be evaluated by considering the totality of the circumstances
with respect to the working environment. Courts already look at
the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an
environment is severe or pervasive enough to trigger harassment
liability.362 Examining the employer's actions would merely extend
that principle to aid in assessing the environment created by the
employer for its employees. Along with showing that it has an
effective anti-harassment policy in place, the employer should be
required to submit evidence on the local norm in the workplace. 63
The prevalence of pin-ups, the manner in which the employer
handled other harassing incidents and attitudes of supervisors
should be relevant to this analysis, regardless of their direct
relevance to the particular incident of harassment. Social science
suggests that if an employer allows other harassing incidents to
occur in the same employment area, they could have the effect of
creating a local norm in which harassment is viewed as being
"normal," "okay" or "no big deal." 64 Therefore, although merely
359. Id. at 765.
360. See supra notes 136-78 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 139-98 and accompanying text.
362. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
363. See Hurley v. Atlanta City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third
Circuit approved admission of such evidence by the plaintiff in spite of a challenge under
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. Id. at 109-10. Evidence of sexual harassment of
other female police officers, as well as evidence of comments made between only male officers
was held admissible in part because '[e]vidence of other acts of harassment is extremely
probative as to whether the harassment was sexually discriminatory and whether the
[defendant] ACPD knew or should have known that sexual harassment was occurring despite
the formal existence of an anti-harassment policy." Id. at 111. It was also used to determine
whether the sexual harassment policy was effective. Id. The plaintiff was unaware of the
existence of male officers' statements and that other women had been harassed until the
discovery phase of the case. Id. at 107-08. For a discussion of local norms and their effects
on incidents of sexual harassment, see supra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
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having an anti-harassment policy will be relevant to this inquiry,
it should not be enough standing alone, unlike lower courts'
suggestions. 65 Instead, the employer should be required to show
that it disseminated its policy, took it seriously and conscientiously
handled complaints falling within the policy.
Although the courts usually protect employee records from
disclosure during the course of a court proceeding,3 6 6 employee
records could be very helpful evidence in demonstrating the local
norms of the workplace. Tools like redaction and in camera review
could be used to protect other employees while allowing relevant
evidence to be admissible."6 7 This necessarily involves evidence that
goes well beyond the alleged harassing incidents directed at a
particular plaintiff. Given the social science data on this point,
however, such additional evidence-including the handling of
harassment directed at other employees, the prevalence of sexually-
demeaning material, etc.-is relevant to the determination of
whether the employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent.., any
sexually harassing behavior."' This will allow courts to assess the
totality of the circumstances without invading the right of privacy
that other employees might have in their personnel records.3 9
365. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc.,
180 F.3d 806, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part II.B (discussing lower court
interpretations of the EllerthlFaragher defense).
366. See, e.g., Brooks v. Gas Co., No. C.A.9 (Cal.), 1998 WL 856525, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov.
19, 1998) (protecting employee records from discovery in Title VII case); Burks v. Okla.
Publ'g Co., 81 F.3d 975,981 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342
(7th Cir. 1994) (protecting employee records from discovery in ADEA cases); Miller v. Fed.
Express Corp., 186 F.R.D. 376, 384 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) ("Personnel records, because of the
privacy interests involved, should not be ordered produced except upon a compelling showing
of relevance.").
367. E.g., Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1999)
(employing in camera review). But see Makar-Wellbon v. Sony Elec., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576,
577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (denying stipulated request for protective order because of insufficient
showing).
368. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 795, 807 (1998).
369. One possible argument against this searching look into the workplace environment
is the chilling effect it could have on employee speech. Much has been written on this topic.
See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title Vil as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and
the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 510-13, 531-40 (1991); Lydia A. Clougherty,
Feminist Legal Methods and the First Amendment Defense to Sexual Harassment Liability,
75 NEB. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1996); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Workplace Harassment and
the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor Volokh, 17 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 321
(1996); Suzanne Sangree, Title VI Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 461, 532-
51 (1995); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the
First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757, 777-82 (1992).
However, the courts rarely find such arguments meritorious. E.g., Tindle v. Caudell,
56 F.3d 966, 971 (8th Cir. 1995); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847,884 n.89
(D. Minn. 1993); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534-37 (M.D.
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Fla. 1991); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 856-57 (Cal. 1999); cf.
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 902 F. Supp. 492, 523 (D.N.J. 1995) (discussing the
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute, which prohibited discrimination based on
"affectational or sexual orientation" and was challenged on First Amendment grounds), affd
on other grounds, 99 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 1996). But see DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging potential First
Amendment problems when the harassing behavior took the form of a column in a
newsletter); Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(reading Playboy in private at the workplace is protected by the First Amendment).
Engaging too deeply in this debate is beyond the scope of this Article. It is a debate
that has raged since Kingsley Browne published an article in 1991, and many learned
scholars have published on the subject. See Browne, supra; e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Architecture of the First Amendment and the Case of Workplace Harassment, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1361, passim (1997); Juan F. Peres, Strange Fruit: Harassment and the First
Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 877-78, 884-86 (1996); Clougherty, supra; see also
Theresa M. Beiner & John M.A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious Employee,
19 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCKL.J. 577, 631 n.355 (1997) (citing numerous articles discussing First
Amendment implications of harassment law). Therefore, my treatment of the issue will be
brief.
In reality, the First Amendment implications of my proposal are minor. First, a
finding of harassment generally includes at least some acts not protected by the First
Amendment. See Browne, supra, at 483 ("[Wlith only one apparent exception no reported
harassment decision has imposed liability solely on the basis of arguably protected
expression.") (footnote omitted). Even the most avid First Amendment advocates concede
that quid pro quo harassment, see, e.g., Browne, supra, at 515, and harassing acts that fit
into other categories of unprotected speech do not warrant First Amendment protection. See,
e.g., id. at 513-31. One example is fighting words. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 389 (1992); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer
on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003, 1006-07, 1015-16
(1993). Other First Amendment exceptions such as labor speech, speech directed at captive
audiences, time, place and manner regulations, defamation, obscenity and indecency and
privacy, see Browne, supra, at 513-31, are arguably applicable in the right hostile
environment fact pattern. See Oppenheimer, supra, at 322-25 (arguing that harassment
often constitutes fighting words, is directed at a captive audience or constitutes a tort). But
see Browne, supra, at 516-20 (arguing that the Court's captive audience cases do not reach
as far as the workplace). In addition, others argue that when harassment is directed at a
particular employee (which it often is) it is not entitled to First Amendment protection. See
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535-36; Beiner & DiPippa, supra, at 632; Eugene Volokh,
Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1863-67
(1992). Others suggest establishing a new subcategory of speech that is unprotected or is
entitled to a lesser amount of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words
That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 133, 172 (1982); Estlund, supra, at 1381.
Evidence of local norms simply places the harassing incidents in a context that might
better explain their meaning and genesis. The employer is not being held liable for the local
norm itself. Instead, the local norm is useful in helping explain whether the employer took
seriously or condoned behavior that could be considered or escalate into harassment. The
plaintiff still must show that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter her
work environment. Thus, it is no longer discrimination in thought, but has become
discrimination in action-having a direct effect on the plaintiff's ability to work.
Second, there is much speech that would be "protected," but admissible in the context
of proving elements of criminal or even civil wrongdoing. See Oppenheimer, supra, at 325.
For example, a political bribery case will no doubt involve speech-including discussions
regarding the terms of the bribe. Yet, those discussions are clearly admissible in the context
of proving that the bribery occurred. Likewise, it seems reasonable to admit evidence of
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Training programs also have implications for this component
of the defense. Employers may use training programs as evidence
that they took reasonable care to prevent harassment. Committing
the time and effort necessary to train employees about sexual
harassment could indicate that the employer is trying to create a
local norm in which harassment is not tolerated. However, given
the few studies on what forms of training are effective, 7' the courts
need to look closely at how seriously the employer takes such
training and how effective that training is likely to be. Indeed, if the
employer has done little else to curb harassment, a token video
training program is not likely to have much effect.37 1 Training
programs during which employees do not pay attention or complete
crossword puzzles are common. That is why interactive programs,
requiring employee participation, are likely more effective.3 72 As a
result, courts should not simply accept that the employer provided
training. They must examine the nature of the training to
determine its effects on local norms and employees who are likely
to sexually harass. A half-hearted attempt at training should not
satisfy the first prong of the Ellerth IFaragher defense because it is
not enough to show that the employer made a reasonable effort to
prevent sexual harassment.
B. Re-evaluating the Second Prong: f[Tihat the Plaintiff
Employee Unreasonably Failed to Take Advantage of Any
Preventive or Corrective Opportunities Provided by the Employer
or to Avoid Harm Otherwise
"473
There are two problems with the second prong of the
Ellerth /Faragher test. First, the holding that the employee must
"fail to avoid harm otherwise'"s7 is so vague as to be unworkable
and should be eliminated entirely. This phrase is open for any
meaning the courts wish to give it. Indeed, the lower courts already
have begun to interpret this prong with very perverse results.7 5
workplace norms to help show that a hostile environment was created.
370. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 179-88 and accompanying text.
372. See Perry et al., supra note 179, at 701.
373. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
374. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
375. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (granting summary
judgment where plaintiff "failed to avoid harm otherwise" because she should have
anticipated second attack by supervisor).
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Second, this prong fails to take into account the most common
employee reactions to harassment, which is initially, at least, to
avoid the situation.37' Courts simply have not proven to be in the
best position to understand the victim's perspective, especially at
the summary judgment stage, where many of these cases are
decided. 77 Harassment victims should not be summarily dismissed
for initially failing to report or delaying reporting until the
incidents are repeated or become more severe. 78 Indeed, expecting
immediate reporting is counter-intuitive, especially given that the
sexual harassment might not yet have reached an actionable level
or a level that the victim believes she can no longer handle. Thus,
the victim of harassment is caught in a difficult catch twenty-two.
If she does not report minor incidents of harassment, she risks
providing support for the employer's showing on the second prong
of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. If she does report these minor
incidents, she may risk losing her job, disrupting her workplace
unnecessarily (if the harassment doesn't persist or escalate) or
other bad outcomes.379 Courts also want to give the employer the
earliest opportunity to correct harassment, preferably before it
reaches an actionable level. It seems that some sort of balance
must be struck between forcing employees to report every minor
incident and letting employers defend based on an employee's
failure to report these minor or initial incidents. Indeed, one easily
could envision a workplace coming to a standstill if every minor
incident of harassment were reported.
C. A Reasonable Solution: Punitive Damages
A reasonable solution that resolves this dilemma and furthers
the underlying purposes of Title VII is to encourage the employer's
preventive and corrective efforts through the use of punitive
damages. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,8 ° it is
clear that punitive damages are available to plaintiffs in sexual
376. See supra notes 259-90 and accompanying text.
377. See generally Beiner, supra note 135 (discussing summary judgement in Title VII
actions); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary
Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 311 (1999) (discussing courts' ready use of
summary judgment in Title VII claims).
378. See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof'l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. CA-97-520-L, 1999 WL 1032614, at
*5 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (deeming four-month delay in reporting rape
unreasonable under prong two of the defense); Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, 64 F. Supp.
2d 1067, 1080 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding delay of five months unreasonable).
379. For a discussion of these potentially bad outcomes, see supra notes 291-335 and
accompanying text.
380. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
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harassment cases if the employer engages in a "discriminatory
practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual. " "' In
addition, compensatory damages are available in all cases of
intentional discrimination. s2 Depending on what the employer has
done with respect to preventing and correcting harassment, the
employer may or may not be liable for punitive damages.
Regardless, the employee should be entitled to compensatory
damages for the injuries she sustained from the harassment. This
solution is consistent with the language of both Faragher383 and
Ellerth,"8 ' as well as with the policies behind the Civil Rights Act of
1991.385
For purposes of the Ellerth IFaragher defense, acts relevant to
liability for harassment occur at several stages. First, the employer
must establish an effective program to prevent harassment.8 s
Second, the program must include a procedure for dealing with
complaints that effectively ends the harassment once the employee
reports it or once the employer becomes aware of it."8 7 Depending
on what the employer has done to prevent and correct the
harassment, it may or may not be liable for punitive damages. In
this manner, the Ellerth/Faragher defense would not preclude
liability entirely; it would simply preclude liability for punitive
damages. The employer would still be liable for compensatory
damages. An employee should not be responsible for the costs
incurred and injuries sustained due to harassment, such as the fees
for treatment by psychiatrists and other medical professionals, as
well as emotional distress. This solution strikes a balance between
the compensatory nature of Title VII and the policy of encouraging
employers to address and prevent sexual harassment. For reasons
I will explain below, the employer should bear the cost to the
employee.
381. Id. § 1981a(b)(1). These damages are capped, depending on the size of the employer.
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
382. Id. § 1981(a)(1).
383. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807 (1998) (noting that the defense
may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages).
384. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (noting that the
defendant may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages).
385. See infra notes 393-409 and accompanying text.
386. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (1998). The only exception
alluded to by, the Court was in the case of smaller employers. In Faragher, the Court
explained that smaller employers might be in the position to prevent harassment informally
and, therefore, not need an official policy. Id. at 808-09.
387. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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There are several ways the damages solution could work in
practice. If the employer can prove that it has an effective training
program in place and a clear and effective policy for redressing
sexual harassment, it should not be liable for any punitive damages
for acts of harassment that occur prior to the employer's becoming
aware of the harassing behavior. However, if the employer has
made no effort to prevent harassment and, perhaps, has even
encouraged it as evidenced by the local workplace norm, the
plaintiff should be eligible for punitive damages from the employer
because this lack of effort by the employer amounts to "reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights" of employees.3"
Another approach would be to reform the standard at a more
fundamental level. If Title VII is really meant to deter harassment,
it seems that the most effective way to do so is to presume that
training programs are ineffective if harassment occurs. In this way,
the courts would encourage employers to adopt training programs
that actually work-that actually prevent harassment in the
workplace. Intuitively, if a training program were truly effective,
supervisors would not be sexually harassing subordinates. If a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate after training, the court
should presume .that the training program was ineffective and
should not be used as a shield by employers to avoid punitive
damages. Using this current standard, the training would not
constitute a "reasonable effort to prevent" harassment. This
presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the program was
effective and that, for some reason, the particular supervisor
involved was an aberration. Without such a showing, the employer
would be required to pay punitive damages.
Awarding punitive damages to harassed employees under such
circumstances would encourage employers to adopt truly effective
training programs because ineffective programs would not insulate
them from liability by virtue of their mere existence. Yet, an
employer would still have an incentive to adopt a training program
because if it does work, it will prevent most harassment and any
resulting liability to the employer as well as liability in the rare
circumstance in which the harassment occurs despite effective
training. Thus, it would prevent most future discrimination-for
which the Court is currently aiming-in a manner that should be
more effective than simply allowing an employer to maintain the
defense by putting a simple training program in place.38 9
388. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX1) (1994).
389. This could conceivably have another beneficial effect. It could encourage those who
provide and develop such training programs to develop programs that actually work, rather
20011 333
334 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:273
Likewise, if an employer unreasonably fails to correct harassing
behavior after an employee's complaint, it has effectively engaged
in a discriminatory practice with "malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual"9 0 and should be liable for punitive damages. If the
employer ends the harassment, however, it might not be liable for
punitive damages (depending also on the effectiveness of its
preventive efforts), but instead would be liable only for
compensatory damages for the harassment that actually occurred.
Although not entirely clear from the policy explanations in
Faragher9' and Ellerth,392 such an approach is consistent with the
purposes of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The primary
objective of Title VII is to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace.393 To help eliminate discrimination, the Court has
emphasized deterrence and compensation of victims. 394  The
Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, recently have shifted their
focus to a latent purpose of Title VII: encouraging voluntary
compliance. 95 In emphasizing compliance, courts have given little
weight to the usefulness of damages to deter discriminatory
conduct. For example, the Supreme Court stated in Ellerth:
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms. Were
employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort to
create such procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to
promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII
context .... To the extent limiting employer liability could
encourage employees to report harassing conduct before it
becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's
deterrent purpose.3"
Likewise, in Faragher, while acknowledging that "Title VII seeks 'to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
than assuming that all training is likely to have some beneficial effect. Given the paucity of
evidence on what constitutes effective training, this could also foster additional study of what
sorts of training programs would be most effective in deterring future harassment.
390. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bXl).
391. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789-92 (1998).
392. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
393. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
394. See id. at 358.
395. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (labeling encouragement of
voluntary compliance as a latent objective, whereas the "more general objective" was "to root
out discrimination in employment").
396. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
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employment discrimination," the Court stated that "its [Title VII's]
'primary objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence
primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm."39
By overemphasizing preventive efforts, the Court ignores
deterrence through damages and compensation (making victims
whole) as other important goals of Title VII. If interpreted as a
complete defense, the Court's holding in Faragher and Ellerth will
prevent victims from being compensated for injuries they incurred
due to harassment. For example, the employer would not be liable
for any resulting medical expenses, including psychiatric or medical
visits, that the harassed employee incurred. In addition, cutting off
damages does not encourage employers to raise awareness
regarding harassment and engage in more effective prevention
efforts. The result is less deterrence than might be gained if the
employer knew it would be liable for at least compensatory
damages.
Compensation is a significant policy underlying Title VII that
the Court has devalued. As the Court explained in McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,g8 a private litigant furthers both
the "deterrence and the compensation objectives" of the anti-
discrimination laws. 9 ' Providing complete defenses to employers
deters litigants and attorneys from bringing sexual harassment
cases, further undermining the deterrence and compensation
purposes of Title VII.4
Notwithstanding the Court's suggestion that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 leaves Meritor's discussion of imputing liability
"intact,"4"' the legislative history of the Act reveals a lot about the
purposes of Title VII.4 O In the Act, Congress made the "make
whole" aspect of Title VII explicit by providing for compensatory
and punitive damages from employers for intentional
discrimination.0 3 In the legislative history surrounding that law,
397. Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,805-06 (1998) (quotingAlbemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
398. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
399. Id. at 358. -
400. Commentators and courts alike have acknowledged the access problems that victims
of employment discrimination have. One significant problem is that these cases, at least
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, did not bring in enough damages to justify a contingent
fee arrangement with attorneys who might represent victims. The result, as Congress
recognized in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, was that harassment victims were unable to seek
effective redress in the court system. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(1), at 70 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 608.
401. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 n.4.
402. See infra notes 404-09 and accompanying text.
403. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
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Congress was emphatic that its purpose in enacting section 1981a
was to compensate victims in a more meaningful manner,
particularly in harassment cases,404 as well as to further the
deterrent effect of Title VII by creating higher damages that would
force employers to take harassment more seriously.4 5 As the House
Report explained:
Strengthening Title VII's remedial scheme to provide monetary
damages for intentional gender and religious discrimination is
necessary to conform remedies for intentional gender and
religious discrimination to those currently available to victims
of intentional race discrimination. Monetarty [sic] damages also
are necessary to make discrimination victims whole for the
terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional
health, and to their self-respect and dignity. Such relief is also
necessary to encourage citizens to act as private attorneys
general to enforce the statute. Monetary damages simply raise
the cost of an employer's engaging in intentional discrimination,
thereby providing employers with additional incentives to
prevent intentional discrimination in the workplace before it
happens.4°
The House Report uses as examples victims of sexual harassment
not being fully compensated. 47 Furthermore, the House explicitly
linked the use of damages to deterring intentional discrimination.0 8
Even members of industries that were affected by this Act admitted
"that under Title VII's current remedial scheme, 'there is little
incentive to set up the kinds of internal controls that companies
need to set up.'"'0 9
While considering the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
contemplated the effect of damages on conciliation efforts and
concluded there was no evidence supporting a negative effect.410 In
this context, Congress discussed the goal of encouraging voluntary
settlement.41' It did not appear directly to contemplate, or even be
concerned with, the effect this might have on an employer's
voluntary compliance with Title VII. This is not surprising because
404. See infra notes 406-09 and accompanying text.
405. See infra notes 406-09 and accompanying text.
406. H. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,602-03.
407. See id. at 66-69.
408. Id. at 65.
409. See id. at 69 (quoting William C. Burns, testifying on behalf of Pacific Gas & Electric
Co.).
410. See id. at 73-74.
411. Id. at 73.
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damages can only serve to encourage voluntary compliance. Thus,
tying an employer's efforts to prevent and correct sexually
harassing behavior to the ability of the plaintiff to collect punitive
damages is a fair compromise that furthers many of the purposes
of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The only possible stumbling block to the use of punitive
damages in this manner is the Court's recent decision in Kolstad v.
American Dental Association."2 However, a careful review of that
case in light of the Court's language in Faragher and Ellerth reveals
that the use of punitive damages is consistent with both the
language of section 1981a and the Kolstad decision. InKolstad, the
Court based liability for punitive damages on "the employer's
knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law.""3
Given the Court's acknowledgment in Faragher that "lilt is by now
well recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment by
supervisors. . . is a persistent problem in the workplace,""4 and the
Court's declaration of its illegality in Meritor in 1986,"x it would be
unusual for an employer not to know that sexual harassment by a
supervisor is prohibited by Title VII. It no longer can be considered
a novel theory in that sense. For example, if an employer refuses
to take action in the face of an employee complaint of harassment,
or if a large employer refuses to provide a policy for addressing
harassment on the job,16 it is reasonable for a court to find that the
employer has acted with "malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual'-which is the
standard set for punitive damages by Congress under section
1981a."1
Beyond this, there is still the Court's language in Kolstad that
states that "an employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where
these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good-faith efforts to
comply with Title VII."" 8 My solution and this aspect of Kolstad
can be read consistently. The Court's use of the word "may"
412. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
413. Id. at 535.
414. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998).
415. Lower courts acknowledged the illegality of sexual harassment well before this case.
E.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
416. I qualify this with the term "large employer" because the Court in Ellerth seems to
suggest that if the employer is small enough, there may not be a need for a formal policy in
order for an employee to have an effective means to complain about harassment. See
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
417. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX1) (1994).
418. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (quoting Kolstad v. Amer.
Dental Ass'n 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
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suggests that it did not mean that in every case the employer would
not be liable based on good faith efforts to prevent harassment. I
would submit that the use of the word "may" indicates that lower
courts should look critically at an employer's alleged "good faith"
efforts. Given the paucity of evidence about the usefulness of
training and the tendency of employers to simply put an anti-
harassment policy into place and assume it will work,419 the courts
should be skeptical of an employer's "good faith" efforts. The courts
need to look critically at the employer's efforts to prevent and
correct harassment to make certain they are effective before
deciding its training and anti-harassment policies meet the "good
faith" standard. This is consistent with my proposal to award
punitive damages to employees where the employer has not taken
adequate preventive measures. In such a case, the courts could
deem the employer's actions as lacking the requisite "good faith."
V. CONCLUSION
The complexity of sexual harassment has proven a challenge
for both the courts and social science researchers. It is clear that
social scientists have information that is valuable to the courts in
developing standards to use in sexual harassment cases. In
particular, the courts do not seem to understand the impact that
employers have on condoning, encouraging or preventing
harassment by simply paying attention to their workplace
environments. Further, the courts' emphasis on making victims
report does not comport with the reality of working Americans'
lives-lives that include a fundamental need for employment that
will lead them to ignore, reinterpret and/or tolerate workplace
harassment. A careful look at the standard set out by the Supreme
Court in the Ellerth and Faragher cases, in light of what social
science reveals, leads to a different approach. This approach will
hopefully more adequately meet the goals of Title VII: to
compensate and make victims whole, as well as to deter
discrimination, while encouraging employers to curb and address
harassment in the workplace.
I have suggested two solutions in this Article. One is for the
courts to pay careful attention to the workplace environment in
assessing the "totality of the circumstances" that made the
harassment of the victim possible. The other is for courts to use
419. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (holding that the employer's failure to
disseminate its anti-harassment policy precluded its use of the defense).
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punitive damages in a creative manner to punish employers who do
not take harassment seriously, while rewarding those who seek to
actively address harassment by not awarding punitive damages.
These solutions provide a key to furthering all of Title VII's
purposes, while addressing harassment in the workplace in a
manner that acknowledges the complexity of the phenomenon. It
is my hope that use of these solutions will lead to more productive
workplaces for both the employer and employee.
